



**Determining the Optimal Work Breakdown  
Structure For Defense Acquisition Contracts**

THESIS

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DEFENSE ACQUISITION CONTRACTS

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty  
Department of Mathematics and Statistics  
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Air Education and Training Command  
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the  
Degree of Master of Science in Cost Analysis

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## **Abstract**

The optimal level of Government Contract Work Breakdown Structure (G-CWBS) reporting for the purposes of Earned Value Management was inspected. The G-Score Metric was proposed, which can quantitatively grade a G-CWBS, based on a new method of calculating an Estimate At Completion (EAC) cost for each reported element. A random program generator created in R replicated the characteristics of DOD program artifacts retrieved from the Cost Analysis Data Enterprise (CADE) system. The generated artifacts were validated as a population, however validation at the demographic combination level using an artificial neural network was inconclusive. Comparative WBS forms were created for a sample of the generated programs, and used to populate a decision tree. Utility theory tools were applied using three utility perspectives, and optimal WBSs were identified. Results demonstrated that reporting at WBS level 3 is the most common optimal structure, however 75% of the time a different optimal structure exists.

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My Wife - Thank you for enabling me to do this

Brian J. Fitzpatrick

# Table of Contents

	Page
Abstract .....	iv
Acknowledgements .....	v
List of Figures .....	ix
List of Tables .....	xii
Preface .....	xiv
I. Introduction .....	1
1.1 Background .....	1
1.2 General Issue .....	1
1.3 Specific Issue .....	2
1.4 Research Objectives .....	3
1.5 The Way Ahead .....	4
Bibliography .....	5
II. Pertinent Previous Research .....	7
2.1 Reporting Requirement .....	7
2.2 Work Breakdown Structure .....	8
Program Work Breakdown Structure .....	9
Contract Work Breakdown Structure .....	10
2.3 Earned Value Management .....	12
2.4 Previous Research .....	16
Qualitative Research .....	16
Quantitative Research .....	18
2.5 Summary .....	19
Bibliography .....	20
III. Alternative Formulation of a Pessimistic Estimate at Completion .....	22
3.1 Introduction .....	22
Background .....	23
Data .....	24
Previous Methods .....	25
Proposed Method .....	28
3.2 Methods .....	34
Margin of Error Application .....	34
Calculate $EAC_G$ .....	40

	Page
Test Against Current Pessimistic EAC .....	40
3.3 Results .....	43
3.4 Discussion and Conclusion .....	43
Bibliography .....	46
IV. Generating Random DoD Program Data .....	48
4.1 Introduction .....	48
4.2 Methodology .....	50
Analysis of Input Variable Distributions .....	50
The Random Program Generator .....	53
Model Validation .....	64
4.3 Results .....	65
4.4 Discussion .....	66
Bibliography .....	67
V. Determining The Optimal Work Breakdown Structure .....	71
5.1 Introduction .....	71
New Tools Have Been Introduced .....	73
Program Management Apprehension .....	74
Identify The Paradigms .....	75
Purpose of Study .....	76
5.2 Methodology .....	76
General Description of Utility Theory Process .....	76
Data Preparation .....	79
Description of Estimating Cost of Implementation .....	79
Utility Multipliers .....	81
Description of Budget Utility Curve Formulation .....	82
Description of Management Utility Curve Formulation .....	83
Description of Public Utility Curve Formulation .....	84
Description of the Decision Tree Tool .....	85
5.3 Results .....	86
5.4 Discussion .....	92
Bibliography .....	95
VI. Discussion .....	97
VII. Appendix: G-Score .....	100
7.1 Introduction .....	101
Previous Research .....	101
7.2 Methodology .....	104
G-Score Formulation .....	104
Regression Analysis .....	105



	Page
Final Regression Model .....	108
G-Score Value Validation .....	108
7.3 Results .....	109
Regression Model Results .....	109
Partial $R^2$ Bootstrap Analysis Result .....	109
7.4 Discussion and Conclusion .....	110
Bibliography .....	112
VIII. Appendix: RPG ANN Validation .....	115
Model Validation .....	115
8.1 Results .....	116
8.2 Discussion .....	116
8.3 Appendix .....	118

## List of Figures

Figure	Page
1. Example Program WBS .....	10
2. Example Contract WBS .....	10
3. Notional Leaf .....	24
4. Army Demographics .....	26
5. Navy Demographics .....	27
6. Air Force Demographics .....	28
7. Joint Demographics .....	29
8. Delta From Final BAC .....	30
9. Difference of Means Test .....	31
10. Reciprocal Function .....	36
11. Lower CL Does Not Cross ID Line .....	37
12. Lower CL Does Cross ID Line .....	38
13. Upper CL Does Not Cross ID Line .....	41
14. Upper CL Does Cross ID Line .....	42
15. EAC Calculation Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test Results .....	43
16. Simulation Process Illustration .....	54
17. Initial Program Cost and Months .....	55
18. Create Work Packages .....	55
19. Software Percentage .....	57
20. Delay Cost Factor .....	58
21. Technology Readiness Level Distribution .....	59
22. Simplified Simulation Process Illustration .....	61

Figure	Page
23. Earned Value Management Illustration .....	63
24. Boxplot Results .....	65
25. T-Test Results .....	66
26. Probability of Adverse Action .....	78
27. Probability of Specific Adverse Actions .....	78
28. Cost to Implement Status Quo Level of Reporting in Generated Programs .....	81
29. PM Budget Utility by Contract % of Portfolio at Different Risk Tolerances .....	84
30. Simplified Decision Tree .....	86
31. Management Utility Optimal Structure Choices .....	87
32. Management Utility Optimal Structure Choices - Binned .....	87
33. Management Utility Range of G-Scores .....	88
34. Management Utility Range of Costs .....	88
35. Budget Utility Optimal Structure Choices .....	88
36. Budget Utility Optimal Structure Choices - Binned .....	89
37. Budget Utility Range of G-Scores .....	89
38. Budget Utility Range of Costs .....	89
39. Public Utility Optimal Structure Choices .....	90
40. Public Utility Optimal Structure Choices - Binned .....	91
41. Public Utility Range of G-Scores .....	91
42. Public Utility Range of Costs .....	91
43. Management Utility Comparison of Status Quo against Alternative Structures .....	92
44. Budget Utility Comparison of Status Quo against Alternative Structures .....	93

Figure		Page
45.	Public Utility Comparison of Status Quo against Alternative Structures .....	93
46.	Bootstrap Analysis of G-Score Impact on Total $R^2$ .....	110
47.	Artificial Neural Network Illustration .....	115
48.	Predicted vs Generated Increase Ranges Per Demographic Combination .....	117
49.	Demographic Combinations Represented in CADE Data Set .....	118
50.	CADE Demographic Combinations by Number of Occurrences .....	119
51.	Percentage of Validation Failures by Branch .....	122
52.	Percentage of Validation Failures by Phase .....	122
53.	Percentage of Validation Failures by Contract Type .....	124
54.	Percentage of Validation Failures by System Type .....	124

## List of Tables

Table	Page
1. Review of Terms and Equations .....	25
2. Army Programs .....	32
3. Navy Programs .....	33
4. Air Force Programs .....	34
5. Joint Programs .....	35
6. Summary of EAC Calculation Comparison Analysis .....	44
7. Cost Increase Distribution By System .....	51
8. Month Distribution By Phase and Branch .....	52
9. Initial Program Cost Distribution By Branch .....	52
10. Variable Distributions .....	53
11. Example of Software Designations .....	56
12. Technology Readiness Levels .....	59
13. Work Breakdown Structure Hierarchy Example .....	62
14. Contract Naming Convention .....	64
15. Utility Multipliers .....	82
16. Discrete Variables .....	106
17. Continuous Variables .....	107
18. Influential Data Point Diagnostics .....	107
19. Final Model Parameter Output .....	109
20. Sequential Sum of Squares Analysis .....	110
21. CADE Combination Groups by Branch .....	120
22. CADE Combination Groups by Phase .....	121

Table		Page
23.	CADE Combination Groups by Contract .....	123
24.	CADE Combination Groups by System .....	125

## Preface

The inspiration for conducting this research effort stemmed from the dissatisfaction I felt at the results presented in the previous research surrounding the topic. Given the amount of earned value management data that the DoD receives, there seemingly had to be a way to objectively grade the potential effectiveness of a work breakdown structure, so that structures could be compared. Likewise, the constant limitation of small data sets was a challenge that seemed conquerable, particularly in light of the significant body of research that has been aimed at individual pieces of the defense acquisition system. With the intuition that there was something to find, and the shoulders of others to stand on providing a clearer vantage, I set off down the path of inquiry that resulted in the following body of research.

# DETERMINING THE OPTIMAL WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE FOR DEFENSE ACQUISITION CONTRACTS

## I. Introduction

### 1.1 Background

The issue of programmatic cost growth has plagued the Department of Defense (DoD) for decades. From 1963 to 1993 cost growth held steady at about 20 percent, even with multiple initiatives being implemented that were designed to reduce the growth (Drezner, 1993). An analysis of programs from 1992 to 2012 illustrated similar cost growth continuing to occur, with only marginal improvements in the last decade, reducing the median cost growth percentage to around 15 percent (DAS, 2013). This improvement demonstrates that acquisition reform can have an impact, but that there is still significant work left to accomplish. To aid in this effort, the tools available must be the right ones for the job, and calibrated in such a way that they perform their function efficiently.

### 1.2 General Issue

One tool with the goal of tackling cost growth that has gained acceptance in the program management community is Earned Value Management (EVM). Originally developed by the Air Force in 1965 and adopted by the DoD as Cost/Schedule Control System Criteria (C/SCSC) in 1967, the earned value criteria and nomenclature were deemed by industry to be too cumbersome and dogmatic (Fleming & Koppelman, 2000), leading to redesign and re-release as the streamlined Earned Value Management



tool in 1997 (Richardson, 2010). EVM enables the measurement and prediction of cost and schedule variances, as well as the prediction of final costs based on cumulative performance.

The EVM data that enables this analysis is based on the government’s contract Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) as required by MIL-STD-881C. This standard requires the Government Contract WBS (G-CWBS) to be broken out to Level 3 in a uniform fashion to allow for comparisons across proposals in the pre-program stages of acquisition. This high level breakout makes the G-CWBS distinct from the Contractor Contract WBS (C-CWBS) in that the C-CWBS is broken out to the Work Package (WP) level, while the G-CWBS is reported at a higher level of abstraction due to the summation of the WPs, which is an important distinction that has not been given more than passing attention in the EVM literature (Fleming & Koppelman, 2000). When EVM is practiced by contractors, the entire Contract WBS down to the work package level is visible and informs management decisions. What the government Program Manager (PM) receives does not contain the level of granularity available to the contractor PM, leading to the possibility of different interpretations of program health (Fleming, 1992).

### **1.3 Specific Issue**

While the current policy, MIL-STD-881C, requires ACAT I programs to receive Earned Value Management reports based on a WBS that is broken out to at least level 3, there has been disagreement in the literature as to what exactly Level 3 entails (Thomas, 1999), and a growing body of study as to which elements are most indicative of potential cost growth. This previous research has stemmed from the government program management communities’ desire to know if asking for deeper levels of data is worth the cost of acquiring that deeper data (Thomas, 1999; Bushey,

2007). This desire for more information is plain to comprehend; the intuition being that with more detailed data, the PM would be able to manage their program more effectively, thereby reducing cost growth.

Unfortunately the previous quantitative research has not been able to adequately answer the question in its broad sense because the research questions and methodology of previous research was limited in scope and data availability. Previous studies have found within certain program types that a single element is predictive of cost growth at lower than WBS Level 1 (Rosado, 2011), that elemental WBS Level 5 data is no better than elemental WBS Level 3 data (Johnson, 2014), and that lower level WBS data does not improve EAC forecast accuracy in space programs (Keaton, 2015). These findings were not generalizable outside of the specific areas of data availability that constrained each research effort.

## **1.4 Research Objectives**

In order to adequately answer the overarching research question, “Is the investment required to request EVM data at levels lower than Level 3 justified by the expected reduction in cost growth due to greater program management visibility?” a new framework of inquiry must be developed.

1. How can a Work Breakdown Structure’s effectiveness be quantitatively measured?
2. How can the issue of insufficient data be resolved?
3. What is the optimal Work Breakdown Structure?
4. What would impede program manager’s adoption of the tool?

## 1.5 The Way Ahead

Given the scope of the research questions, this thesis will follow a scholarly article, or k-paper, format. Before answering the overarching research question, a brief background will be given concerning reporting requirements, Work Breakdown Structure formulation, Earned Value Management, and a review of the literature on previous attempts to answer the question both qualitatively and quantitatively. The contents of this section will be referenced throughout the body of the work, and provide the necessary background for understanding the relevance and importance of subsequent sections. Once this background foundation has been set, the first step in the process of answering the overarching research question will be laying the mathematical foundations discussed in Chapter 3, “Alternative Formulation of a Pessimistic Estimate at Completion,” and the Appendix “Introducing a Metric to Quantify Work Breakdown Structure Effectiveness.” The new method of calculating Estimate At Completion:  $EAC_{Comp.G}$ , provides a tool that incorporates the size and weight of the leaf elements of the work breakdown structure. This new tool will enable a proposed metric, the  $G - Score$ , to be established that will highlight WBS leaf elements that are not granular enough to provide sufficient management information. In order to resolve the issue of insufficient data, a simulation will be proposed in Chapter 4, “Generating Random DoD Program Data.” This simulation will require the in-depth study of variable interaction, the creation of a random program generator to create EVM data files, and the validation of the produced data files as being representative of actual data. With this validated data set, various tools of decision analysis will be used and discussed in Chapter 5, “Determining The Optimal Work Breakdown Structure.”

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## II. Pertinent Previous Research

Cost reporting requirements have been in place since 1967 that require Acquisition Category-I (ACAT-I) programs to produce and use a WBS with work packages broken out at least three levels (MIL-STD-881C, 2011). Intuitively, receiving program data broken out to lower levels would enable the PM to more effectively manage the program. This point has been argued qualitatively (Thomas, 1999; Bushey, 2007), and quantitative analysis has attempted to demonstrate value at greater levels of granularity; however, the results have been limited in scope (Rosado, 2011; Keaton, 2015) or negative in nature (Johnson, 2014; Keaton, 2015). The reasons given for the weakness of the previous findings revolves around a lack of sufficient data, without which robust results cannot be achieved.

In this chapter financial reporting requirements will be examined, various Work Breakdown Structure definitions and concepts will be explored, a primer on Earned Value Management will be presented, and previous qualitative and quantitative research focusing on WBS level of reporting will be discussed.

### 2.1 Reporting Requirement

The introduction of C/SCSC coincided with the publishing of MIL-STD-881, which is currently published as MIL-STD-881C. Concerning the work breakdown structure, the guidance states, “The goal is to develop a WBS that defines the logical relationship among all program elements to a specific level (typically Level 3 or 4) of indenture that does not constrain the contractor’s ability to define or manage the program and resources.” It further stipulates that additional granularity may be requested for program elements deemed to be high-cost or high-risk, as long as the further breakdown of report elements is logical. While 881C admits that breaking

out program elements can provide valuable historical data for the estimation of future program efforts, the desire for this data should not be the primary force in changes to the program's reporting structure. Instead, the goal should be creating a structure that allows for the, "program status to be continuously visible so the program manager and the contractor can identify, coordinate, and implement changes necessary for desired results."

The implementation of these standards did enable DoD Program Managers to compare proposed programs against each other as well as against historical programs, greatly increasing assurance of program reasonableness and estimated final cost estimates. With the introduction of these standards, "it became more difficult - but still not impossible - for contractors to "buy into" individual procurements, and to keep their cost overruns hidden until it was too late to do anything about them," (Fleming, 1992). In order to avoid this situation, or the less nefarious situation on the Government PM and the Contractor PM honestly mis-communicating or misinterpreting the health of the program, the G-CWBS must be properly designed to ensure adequate informational flow.

## **2.2 Work Breakdown Structure**

A key function of a program manager is to monitor the status of the program and make adjustments as necessary. In order to know when an adjustment is needed, the PM relies on various metrics; and when a metric goes beyond preconceived bounds, course correction is expected (Eisner, 2008). Corrective action includes making adjustments to the baseline for both cost and schedule, and requiring that future periods be adjusted in order to attempt to get the project back on schedule and cost (Eisner, 2008). EVM, sometimes used synonymously with Earned Value Analysis, provides


the formal mathematical framework to measure these cost and schedule variances, as well as provide forecasts of program health based on them.

The program management tool that provides the data for the EVM analysis is the WBS. The Program Management Institute's Program Management Book of Knowledge(PMBOK) defines the WBS as "a deliverable-oriented hierarchical decomposition of the work to be executed by the team" (PMBOK, 2000). At the lowest level, the WBS is composed of Work Packages, that by definition represent 100% of the project effort. Furthermore, each group of lower level children nodes sum to 100% of their parent node, so that the entire effort is represented (Richardson, 2010). While the Program Management Institute's general definitions adequately describe the WBS process implemented in industry, the DoD's implementation has significant differences that must be understood. The primary difference is that, due to the scope of the efforts involved in DoD programs, there are multiple Work Breakdown Structures conceived for each program.


### **Program Work Breakdown Structure.**

The Program Work Breakdown Structure (PWBS) represents the entire program. For example an entire aircraft would require a Program WBS. This is used by the government program manager for strategic decision making and long term visibility. While the Program WBS is a living document early in the pre-program phases, after iterative refinements it should become relatively static, representing a bottoms up understanding of the program with buy-in from all stakeholders (Richardson, 2010). An example based on MIL-STD-881C of the first three levels of a PWBS is illustrated in Figure 1.





**Figure 1. Example Program WBS**



**Figure 2. Example Contract WBS**

### **Contract Work Breakdown Structure.**

The Contract Work Breakdown Structure (CWBS) is the WBS for a specific Element of the Program WBS that is represented by a contracted effort. Unlike the Program WBS which is a living document, the Contract WBS must be fully developed before the contract is put in place, as it is the mechanism for future discussion and reporting between the contractor program manager and the government program manager. Figure 2 is an illustration of the first three levels of a CWBS.

The numbering nomenclature put forth in MIL-STD-881C becomes confusing when the distinction between Program WBS and Contract WBS is not understood

or taken into account. As Figure 2 demonstrates, the Level 1 of a Contract WBS represents a Level 3 Element of the Program WBS. Further distinction must be made between the CWBS that the contractor uses for internal program management, and the CWBS that is reported to the government to satisfy the MIL-STD-881C requirements.

### **Contractor Contract Work Breakdown Structure.**

The Contractor Contract WBS (C-CWBS) is designed by the contractor to internally manage the program. The expectation set forth in MIL-STD-881C (2.5.3) is that the contractor will extend the CWBS, “...to the appropriate lower level that satisfies critical visibility requirements and does not overburden the management control system.” While the contractor might not follow the industry heuristic of extending the C-CWBS to work packages containing approximately 80 hours of effort due to the large size of the programs, industry best practice still calls for the final WBS to contain a set of appropriately small work packages as the lowest elements (Richardson, 2010).

### **Government Contract Work Breakdown Structure.**

A summary of the data from the C-CWBS is reported to the Government Program Manager for the Government’s control effort in the form of the Government Contract WBS (G-CWBS). MIL-STD-881C (1.5.3.C) notes that, “A WBS can be expressed to any level of detail. While the top three levels are the minimum required for reporting purposes on any program or contract, effective management of complex programs requires WBS definition at considerably lower levels.” Justifiable reasons for requiring increased granularity include elements that are high-cost, high-risk, or of a specific technical nature. “In this case, managers should distinguish between WBS

definition and WBS reporting. The WBS should be defined at the level necessary to identify work progress and enable effective management, regardless of the WBS level reported to program oversight” (MIL-STD-881C). In order to differentiate between the lowest element of the C-CWBS - a work package, the term “Leaf Element” will be used when describing the most granular elements of the G-CWBS.

### **2.3 Earned Value Management**

The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology & Logistics’ Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses office defines EVM as a, “... program management tool to provide joint situational awareness of program status and to assess the cost, schedule, and technical performance of programs for proactive course correction.” Furthermore, EVM is required on Cost/Incentive contracts per DODI 5000.02 depending on total program cost, and is rarely used on fixed price contracts.

Characteristics of EVM include requiring a fully defined baseline integrating technical scope and authorized funding and personnel, set within an established schedule, as well as mechanisms providing program managers early warning about programmatic issues enabling course corrections in a timely manner (Fleming & Koppelman, 2000). The Contract Performance Report (CPR) is the primary means of communicating EVM data from the contractor to the government, providing cost and schedule performance data that can be used to identify programmatic issues and forecast future performance (MIL-STD-881C). EVM can be applied to a specific period, or as a cumulative measure. As the period calculations vary significantly and are individually not useful for forecasting, focus will be given primarily to the cumulative measures explained next.

**Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled.** The budgeted cost of work scheduled (BCWS) or Planned Value (PV) represents the dollars that are planned to be spent on work efforts for a given time period. This figure can also represent the cumulative budgeted cost of work scheduled from contract initiation through the current period.

$$BCWS = \text{Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled} \quad (1)$$

**Budgeted Cost of Work Performed.** The budgeted cost of work performed (BCWP) or Earned Value (EV) represents the dollars that were planned to be spent on work efforts regardless of the time period that the work was actually accomplished. This figure can also represent the cumulative budgeted cost of work performed from contract initiation through the current period.

$$BCWP = \text{Budgeted Cost of Work Performed} \quad (2)$$

**Actual Cost of Work Performed.** The actual cost of work performed (ACWP) or Actual Cost (AC) represents the dollars that were actually spent on work efforts at the time they were actually accomplished, regardless of the original time period or planned cost. This figure can also represent the cumulative actual cost of work performed from contract initiation through the current period.

$$ACWP = \text{Actual Cost of Work Performed} \quad (3)$$

**Schedule Variance.** In order to determine if a program is ahead or behind schedule, Schedule Variance (SC) can be calculated by subtracting the budgeted cost of work that should have been done by the period under review from the budgeted cost of work that has actually been completed by the period under review.

$$SV = BCWP - BCWS \quad (4)$$

**Schedule Variance(t).** Schedule Variance derived from (4) will converge to 1.0 by definition, rendering it useless for analysis after approximately the 60% completion point (Richardson, 2010). An alternative calculation has been proposed and refined as a separate branch of EVM theory called Earned Schedule (ES) which makes use of elapsed time  $t$  instead of elapsed dollars. The calculation of schedule variance by ES is noted as  $SV(t)$ , and is presented here for completeness, however the earned schedule formulations will remain outside the scope of the current investigation which focuses on the estimates that can be made in the first half of the program's schedule, and would thus not benefit significantly from implementing ES.

$$SV(t) = \text{Earned Schedule} - \text{Actual Time} \quad (5)$$

**Cost Variance.** In order to determine if we are over or under budget, Cost Variance (CV) can be calculated by subtracting the actual cost of work that has been accomplished by the period under review from the budget cost of work that has been accomplished by the period under review.

$$CV = BCWP - ACWP \quad (6)$$

**Cost Performance Index.** Allowing an understanding of cost efficiency is the Cost Performance Index (CPI). This is calculated by taking the ratio of the budgeted amount to the actual cost for work performed. If the actual cost is greater than the budgeted cost, the performance index is less than 1.0 representing inefficient use of funds. This index can be calculated using either period or cumulative measures.

$$CPI = \frac{BCWP}{ACWP} \quad (7)$$

**Schedule Performance Index.** Similar to the CPI, the Schedule Performance Index (SPI) provides a way of reporting schedule efficiency. This index can also be calculated using either period or cumulative measures.

$$SPI = \frac{BCWP}{BCWS} \quad (8)$$

**Schedule Performance Index(t).** Similar to  $SV(t)$ , SPI can be calculated using the Earned Schedule method.

$$SPI(t) = \frac{Earned\ Schedule}{Actual\ Time} \quad (9)$$

**Estimate At Completion - CPI Method.** In order to forecast the total cost of the completed effort, the Estimate At Completion (EAC) can be calculated in a few different ways. A primary method involves taking cost efficiency in the form of the cumulative CPI into account.

$$EAC_{CPI} = ACWP_{CUM} + \frac{BAC - BCWP_{CUM}}{CPI_{CUM}} \quad (10)$$

**Estimate At Completion - Composite Method.** A more complex method of calculating EAC is the composite method where both the cost and schedule effi-

ciencies are taken into account. This is generally seen as the worst case scenario EAC estimate and is often used as an upper bound for planning purposes. This formula uses either the standard SPI calculation as an input, or the ES SPI(t), as well as potentially imposing weights on the cumulative CPI and SPI.

$$EAC_{Composite} = ACWP_{CUM} + \frac{BAC - BCWP_{CUM}}{CPI_{CUM} * SPI_{CUM}} \quad (11)$$

With an understanding of Work Breakdown Structures, Earned Value Management concepts and mechanics, and the policy foundation requiring cost and schedule reporting, a review of previous research surrounding optimal WBS structuring will be provided.

## 2.4 Previous Research

The policy that requires cost and schedule reporting leaves ample space for program managers to customize their management approach, however the guidance on how to use the flexibility on WBS formulation is sparse. Attempts to answer the question of the most useful structure and level of reporting for program management control have been both qualitative and quantitative. A short summary of these previous efforts is reported next.

### **Qualitative Research.**

Thomas (1999) and Bushey (2007) investigated the implementation of reporting policy and presented conceptual frameworks for more useful implementation. Thomas found that the policy in place had detrimental affects on improvement initiatives, and Bushey proposed significantly increasing the contractor reporting requirements.

Thomas provides an in-depth review of the literature surrounding the creation and implementation of the MIL-HBK-881, and attempts to determine if the policies it con-

tains actually impede acquisition reform initiatives and a PM's ability to manage. He bases his findings that the policy does in fact hinder acquisition reform initiatives and program management based on personal experience and interviews with government and contractor personnel. He posits that a WBS prepared in accordance with (IAW) MIL-HBK-881 will not provide sufficient insight into many of the elements.

The concept that limiting reporting at too broad a level will inhibit a PM's ability to manage is not controversial, but this scenario is only likely if the PM does the minimum required by the MIL-HBK-881. That policy directs the PM to ensure that their WBS is broken out to sufficient detail to allow visibility. What seems to be lacking in the PM community is a method for determining when sufficient detail has been achieved, or when further break-out is required.

Bushey describes the appropriate level of breakout in qualitative terms, noting that an effective cost reporting structure requires flexibility to enable various forms of analysis. EVM practiced at the program level only does not provide this flexibility, because there is no ability to determine root-causes of issues with such a high level data point. He goes on to propose a WBS structure down to the Work Package level, as this will allow identification of root causes in cost and schedule discrepancies, and facilitate discussions with the Control Account Managers (CAMs) who are in a position to provide information and alternative action recommendations to the government PM.

This recommendation is correct within the vacuum of a desire for visibility. It is not, however, practical, and does not consider the flexibility by the contractor to modify individual work packages without going through the bureaucratic maneuvers necessary to modify the Government Contract WBS. The implementation of reporting at the Work Package level would increase the reporting burden on the contractor, as



well as contractually require approval for every minor modification, both of which would increase the cost to the government.

### **Quantitative Research.**

Quantitative efforts surrounding report structuring and the value of lower level reporting have focused on the predictive ability of lower level data elements compared to the same data element reported at a higher level within the same program.

Rosado (2011) attempted to determine if overall program EVM characteristics were consistent throughout the lower levels of the WBS. With a data set of 34 programs, he was able to demonstrate a correlation between the Development Test & Evaluation element at level 3 and the program EAC. While helpful in forecasting potential EAC growth, this result provides limited insight into the actual value of acquiring lower level WBS data, however Rosado concludes that there is, "... potential for improved prediction models using low level WBS EV data."

Johnson (2014) built on Rosado's research and attempted to determine if elemental EVM data at Level 5 could provide earlier detection of cost growth than Level 3 EVM data. With a data set of 40 ACAT I programs, he concluded that elemental information at Level 5 provided no useful increase in predictive capability compared to Level 3 data.

Keaton (2015) took a narrow focus on 9 space acquisition contracts in an attempt to determine if using lower level EVM data could better predict final cost estimates. An issue that arose was the presence of great variability in the lower level WBS elements making comparisons across contracts difficult. Due to the variability across the contracts, the small sample size, and the method of comparing specific elements, Keaton concluded that, "...lower level WBS data does not improve space program EAC accuracy."

## 2.5 Summary

In this chapter, a review of the reporting requirements outlined in DoDI 5000.02 and MIL-STD-881C has been presented requiring the use of Earned Value Management on specific government acquisition contracts. The Work Breakdown Structure, which details the reportable elements for EVM, was presented in three forms, the Program WBS, the Contractor-Contract WBS, and the Government-Contract WBS. A primer on Earned Value Management metrics was presented detailing the formulas to be used, as well as explaining their meaning. Finally a review of previous research showed that qualitative studies have found that minimal adherence to the reporting guidelines produces data of minimal usefulness, and requiring G-CWBS broken out to the Work Package level has been proposed as a response. Quantitative analysis has resulted in an argument for using Level 3 data instead of relying on only program Level 1 data for management decisions, but has not yet demonstrated increased predictive ability from using lower than Level 3.

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### III. Alternative Formulation of a Pessimistic Estimate at Completion

#### Abstract

Lack of visibility into contractors' handling of specific work packages is an issue that degrades government program managers' ability to identify and remedy programmatic issues. While Earned Value Management(EVM) provides a cost and schedule control framework, current work breakdown structures are rarely granular enough to provide actionable insight before issues become unmissable and generally uncorrectable. This paper presents an alternative formulation of the EVM metric Estimate At Completion(EAC), that provides a pessimistic estimate for each leaf element based on the cost and schedule performance index variance and dollar weight of all leaf elements. Creating this formulation required a new method to calculate index variance that maintained the values in unit space. The new formulation,  $EAC_{G-}$ , provided a true upper bound in over 85% of programs studied, and enables EVM practitioners the ability to identify elements that are not sufficiently granular which would require additional program management attention.

#### 3.1 Introduction

A problem in program management is a lack of visibility to contractor movements of work package efforts. Visibility is limited to the agreed upon form of the Contract Work Breakdown Structure (CWBS) used to report Earned Value Management (EVM) data. While EVM has been the cost and schedule control tool of choice for the past two decades, there is still room for improvement in practice and understanding. One such area of improvement is the method of calculating a pessimistic Estimate At Completion (EAC). A review of the data presented in Section 1.2 shows that the

current method of calculation,  $EAC_{Comp}$ , does not estimate an appropriate upper bound in over 85% of programs studied<sup>1</sup>. Adding to this issue is the gross disparity in weight between reported elements, with a range of weights between 100% of total program costs to less than 0.001% of total program costs<sup>2</sup>. This wide range skews the intuitive interpretation of the metrics calculated for those elements. A better tool that accounts for element weight and provides a more consistent upper bound is desirable to highlight those areas of a contract that will need special program management attention. A method of calculating a pessimistic EAC by placing confidence limits may provide such a tool. The objective of this paper is to present an alternative formulation of  $EAC_{Comp}$ , based on element weight, which provides a more consistent upper bound to final program cost than the currently employed pessimistic method.

## Background.


In order to ensure consistency of terms, Table 1 is provided. All terms should be familiar to EVM practitioners, with the exception of the term *Leaf*, which has been proposed in order to contrast *work package* in terms of government visibility. The issue of visibility is illustrated simply in Figure 1. This figure shows the invisible work packages that make up the lowest level of data reported by the contractor to the government. As this reported element is at the end of the WBS branch reported to the government, the element will be referred to as a leaf. This is in contrast to the work packages, which are in fact the lowest level of management breakout, and which are visible to the contractor. The top set of work packages in the figure represent how the work is planned, and its level of difficulty. The second set of work packages illustrates that the contractor was able to shift the work packages within the leaf element, based on difficulty. Finally, the lowest rows of the figure show that based

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<sup>1</sup>Calculated Comparing the Program EAC at 10% complete against the Program EAC at 60% complete

<sup>2</sup>Further breakout with distribution by branch is illustrated in Figures 2,3,4, and 5

on the movement of work packages within the leaf element, the Cost Performance Index (CPI) and Schedule Performance Index (SPI) metrics appear to be acceptable through period 4. After this point the SPI metric will trend toward unity, and the CPI metric has a significant drop off. Only after this point would the EVM metric alert the Program Manager (PM) to potential issues caused by the difficult work packages. While Figure 1 represents a very small effort, the issue it illustrates, that a lack of visibility within the leaf element reduces a PM’s ability to effectively manage their program, needs to be addressed.



**Figure 3. Notional Leaf**

## Data.

The data used for analysis was retrieved from the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Cost Assessment Data Enterprise (OSD CADE) system. Of the 276 contract files available in the database, 108 had EVM data broken out into WBS elements, of which 74 contracts had data representing over 60% contract completion. The program contracts used for analysis are listed in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5, and demographic information is illustrated in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5. The decision to include programs with over 60% contract completion was based on a desire to include as many programs as possible, and is supported by the analysis illustrated in Figures 6 and 7,

**Table 1. Review of Terms and Equations**

Term	Description	
<i>BCWS</i>	Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled (BCWS) or Planned Value (PV) represents the dollars that are planned to be spent on work efforts for a given time period.	
<i>BCWP</i>	Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) or Earned Value (EV) represents the dollars that were planned to be spent on work efforts regardless of the time period that the work was actually accomplished.	
<i>ACWP</i>	Actual Cost of Work Performed (ACWP) or Actual Cost (AC) represents the dollars that were actually spent on work efforts at the time they were actually accomplished, regardless of the original time period or planned cost.	
<i>C – CWBS</i>	Contractor's Contract Work Breakdown Structure (C-CWBS) - The contract work breakdown structure that the contractor uses for internal management of a contracted effort, broken out to the work package level. No summarization occurs in the C-CWBS. All data is visible to the contractor.	
<i>G – CWBS</i>	Government's Contract Work Breakdown Structure (G-CWBS) - The contract work breakdown structure that the government program manager receives control reports based on, summarized at a high level.	
<i>Work Package</i>	Defined by the Program Management Institute as a deliverable or project work component at the lowest level of each branch of the work breakdown structure (PMBOK, 2000). As the PMI's definition is aimed toward industry practitioners, it is understood that the work breakdown structure referred to in the definition is the C-CWBS.	
<i>Leaf</i>	Term used to differentiate the terminal information node of a G-CWBS, compared to the work package of the C-CWBS. The leaf element represents an element that no longer branches into further elements.	
Term	Equation	Description
<i>CPI</i>	$\frac{BCWP}{ACWP}$	Cost Performance Index (CPI) allows an understanding of cost efficiency. This is calculated by taking the ratio of the budgeted amount to the actual cost for work performed. If the actual cost is greater than the budgeted cost, the performance index is less than 1.0 representing inefficient use of funds.
<i>SPI</i>	$\frac{BCWP}{BCWS}$	Schedule Performance Index (SPI), similar to the CPI, the Schedule Performance Index (SPI) provides a way of reporting schedule efficiency.
<i>EAC<sub>Comp</sub></i>	$ACWP_{CUM} + \frac{BAC - BCWP_{CUM}}{CPI_{CUM} * SPI_{CUM}}$	Estimate at Complete (Composite Method) is a more complex method of calculating EAC where both the cost and schedule efficiencies are taken into account. This is generally seen as the worst case scenario EAC estimate and is often used as an upper bound for planning purposes. This formula can use either the standard SPI calculation as an input, or the ES SPI(t), as well as imposing weights on the CPI and SPI.

which shows that the budget at complete (BAC) is significantly less variable after the 60% completion point, with a mean change less than 7%. Focus was placed on BAC stability as this is the metric that was the baseline for the comparative tests between the current pessimistic EAC and the alternative EAC presented. Also of note, specific programmatic anomalies are visible in Figure 6, but this data was left in the analysis as no justification for its removal was found.

### Previous Methods.

Statistical methods have been applied to Earned Value Management generally (Lipke & Vaughn, 2000; Lipke, 2002; Anbari, 2003; Lipke, 2006; Wang, Jiang, Gou,






Figure 4. Army Demographics

Che, & Zhang, 2006; Leu & Lin, 2008), and to forecasting Schedule Performance Index specifically (Lipke, Zwikael, Henderson, & Anbari, 2009; Colin & Vanhoucke, 2014). A common method presented in these studies was to transform the index data into natural log space in order to estimate the parameters required to calculate confidence limits. This transformation is very appealing due to its ability to normalize the index data which is often very skewed, its ease of implementation, and certain properties of the log-normal distribution which proved useful for various assumptions that were made in the previous research. In particular the confidence limit standard deviation requires a mean value for calculation, and the natural log of the cumulative index value is reported as being a good estimator (Lipke, 2009).





Figure 5. Navy Demographics

While the natural log transformation is appealing, its use proved problematic in the current study for three reasons. Two issues stem from using the cumulative index value as an estimator of the index mean. Computationally, this would require sufficient time to have passed to enable enough periods to accrue that would yield a suitable cumulative index value. This is undesirable in that information is desired earlier, while the validity of that information increases as time passes. An inference made too early is likely invalid, while an inference made on valid data is likely too late to be of use. The second issue is purpose. The fact that the cumulative index value is a good estimate of the mean is the very problem that the current study is aiming to address, in that the cumulative index represents an average. Averages hide significant



**Figure 6. Air Force Demographics**

values, and it is specifically those values that need to be highlighted for program management oversight. The final issue that precluded the use of the log-normal transformation is its inability to appropriately treat weighting. As a central concept in the problem is that elements have a range of weights, this must be accounted for in the confidence limit calculations, which proved problematic using log-normal transformed data.




Figure 7. Joint Demographics

### Proposed Method.

It will be useful to first describe the phenomena under investigation. The indexes focused on are represented by Equations 12 and 13.

$$CPI = \frac{BCWP}{ACWP} \quad (12)$$

$$SPI = \frac{BCWP}{BCWS} \quad (13)$$

both of which can be generalized to




Figure 8. Delta From Final BAC

$$Index = \frac{Constant}{Variable} \quad (14)$$


or:

$$Y = \frac{K}{X} \quad (15)$$

which transforms into:

$$Y = K^{-X} \quad (16)$$

The graph of Equation 16 when  $K = 1$  is plotted, along with the identity line  $y = x$ , in Figure 8. The index essentially tells the analysts the magnitude in dollars away from the expected value of the program for either schedule or cost. For example, if the expected cost is \$1000 and the actual cost is \$200, then the  $CPI = \frac{1000}{200} = 5$ . This tells the analyst that the actual cost was 5 times less than expected. The same dollar value difference as a cost overage, represented by  $CPI = \frac{1000}{1800} = 0.55$ , represents the magnitude away from expected along the curve below the identity line; therefore in order to calculate the magnitude the reciprocal must be taken:  $\frac{1}{0.55} = 1.8$ . The



**Figure 9. Difference of Means Test**

analyst therefore knows that at  $CPI = 0.5\bar{5}$  the element is 1.8 times more than expected. A general form of this principle used to find the magnitude away from expected value in the index is given in Equation 17. Note that the reciprocal form is negative due to the fact that it is undesirable and below the identity line.

$$Magnitude = \begin{cases} Index \geq K : & Index \\ Index < K : & -\frac{K}{Index} \end{cases} \quad (17)$$

This transformation normalizes the index data around the constant  $K$ , just as the log-normal transform espoused by previous studies, however with the benefit of staying in unit space as opposed to going into log space. This is essential as the weight of each element is described as a percentage in unit space.

Now with an understanding of the environment the indexes reside in, factors contributing to the lack of visibility can be addressed. One of the issues that plague the current Government Contract WBS (G-CWBS) Leaf elements' ability to accurately reflect program cost and schedule efficiencies arise from the variance in sizes of the leaf elements. A leaf element that represents 10% of the contract with an unfavorable

**Table 2. Army Programs**

Program	Branch	Months	Phase	Contract
BLACK HAWK UPG	Army	56	RDTE	Cost Plus
EXCALIBER	Army	17	PROD	Cost Plus
FBCB2	Army	68	RDTE	Cost Plus
GCSS ARMY	Army	83	RDTE	Cost Plus
GCV	Army	25	NA	Fixed Price Incentive
IAMD	Army	61	RDTE	Cost Plus
JAGM	Army	26	RDTE	Fixed Price Incentive
JLTV	Army	22	RDTE	Other
JTN	Army	55	NA	Cost Plus
JTRS GMR	Army	74	NA	Other
LMP2	Army	13	NA	Cost Plus
MH60R	Army	51	RDTE	Cost Plus
MH60S	Army	48	NA	Cost Plus
PAC3MSE	Army	31	NA	Cost Plus
PatriotMeadsCap	Army	59	NA	Other
STRYKER	Army	53	RDTE	Cost Plus
TMC	Army	42	NA	Cost Plus
WIN2	Army	35	RDTE	Cost Plus
WIN3	Army	39	RDTE	Cost Plus

$CPI = .5$  should have more impact than a leaf element representing 0.5% of the contract with a favorable  $CPI = 2$ . Therefore, any tool devised must handle this discrepancy in sizing. The method chosen for the  $EAC_G$  formulation is to calculate the weighted standard deviation (Formula 18) where  $w_i$  is the weight (calculated as  $\frac{BAC_i}{BAC}$ ) of the Leaf  $x_i$ , and  $x_i$  represents the magnitude of the efficiency metric being studied. Using the weighted variance calculation will reduce the impact of any extreme data values that do not represent a large portion of the effort, while giving more power to the index data points that represent the majority of the program effort.

$$s = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^n w_i x_i^2 * \sum_{i=1}^n w_i - \left(\sum_{i=1}^n w_i x_i\right)^2}{\left(\sum_{i=1}^n w_i\right)^2 - \sum_{i=1}^n w_i^2}} \quad (18)$$

The leaf elements of the G-CWBS represent the whole contracted effort, and yet do not represent each individual work package. From this perspective, the leafs

**Table 3. Navy Programs**

Program	Branch	Months	Phase	Contract
AAG	Navy	36	RDTE	Cost Plus
AIM9X	Navy	8	RDTE	Other
AIM9XBII	Navy	34	RDTE	Cost Plus
AMDR	Navy	26	RDTE	Fixed Price Incentive
CEC	Navy	53	RDTE	Cost Plus
CH53K	Navy	109	RDTE	Cost Plus
CobraJudy	Navy	73	RDTE	Cost Plus
CVN78	Navy	73	PROD	Other
DDG1000	Navy	114	NA	Other
E2DAHE	Navy	108	NA	Other
EA18G	Navy	60	RDTE	Other
EFV	Navy	74	RDTE	Cost Plus
GATOR	Navy	58	RDTE	Cost Plus
H1UPG	Navy	84	RDTE	Cost Plus
JATAS	Navy	20	RDTE	Cost Plus
JHSV	Navy	55	RDTE	Fixed Price Incentive
JPALS	Navy	70	RDTE	Cost Plus
JSOW	Navy	67	RDTE	Cost Plus
LCSMM	Navy	14	RDTE	Cost Plus
LHA6	Navy	85	PROD	Fixed Price Incentive
MIDS	Navy	20	RDTE	Cost Plus
MUOS	Navy	109	RDTE	Cost Plus
NMT	Navy	64	RDTE	Cost Plus
P8A	Navy	128	NA	Cost Plus
RMS	Navy	18	NA	Cost Plus
SSN774	Navy	65	PROD	Fixed Price Incentive

of the G-CWBS can be viewed as sample data representing the population of data available in the Contractor-Contract WBS (C-CWBS) that makes up the sample (leaf). With this in mind, the margin of error (ME) of the sample data is a desirable piece of information, as a more robust understanding of the underlying values will aide greatly in decision making. In the margin of error formula (Formula 19)  $z$  represents the desired level of confidence,  $s$  represents the weighted standard deviation, and  $n$  represents the number of leaf elements that the margin of error will be applied to. For the purposes of the calculations presented,  $n$  will always equal 1, as we are concerned



**Table 4. Air Force Programs**

Program	Branch	Months	Phase	Contract
AC130J	AirForce	29	NA	Cost Plus
AEHF	AirForce	147	NA	Cost Plus
AWACS UPG	AirForce	13	NA	Cost Plus
B2DMS	AirForce	18	RDTE	Cost Plus
B2EHF2	AirForce	13	RDTE	Cost Plus
B2MOP	AirForce	20	RDTE	Cost Plus
B61-12TKA	AirForce	27	EMD	Cost Plus
C130AMP	AirForce	69	NA	Other
C130J	AirForce	81	NA	Cost Plus
EELV	AirForce	12	PROD	Cost Plus
F22A32B	AirForce	35	EMD	Cost Plus
F22Raptor	AirForce	24	PROD	Cost Plus
FA18EF	AirForce	21	RDTE	Cost Plus
FABT	AirForce	77	RDTE	Firm Fixed Price
GPS OCX	AirForce	21	RDTE	Other
HCMC130	AirForce	50	NA	Cost Plus
ISPAN	AirForce	77	RDTE	Cost Plus
JASSM	AirForce	20	NA	Fixed Price Incentive
MGUE	AirForce	28	RDTE	Cost Plus
MPRTIP	AirForce	126	RDTE	Cost Plus
MPS	AirForce	69	RDTE	Cost Plus
MQ1B	AirForce	43	PROD	Cost Plus
MQ9	AirForce	49	PROD	Cost Plus
NAVSTAR GPS	AirForce	33	NA	Other
SDBII	AirForce	54	EMD	Fixed Price Incentive

with the margin of error around 1 data point at a time. Formula 18 produces  $s_{index}$  which is used for every leaf under the assumption that the standard deviation of visible leaf elements in the program is representative of the standard distribution of the unreported lower level data elements of the C-CWBS.

$$ME_{index,leaf} = \frac{z * s_{index}}{\sqrt{n}} \quad (19)$$

Table 5. Joint Programs

Program	Branch	Months	Phase	Contract
AHLTA	Joint	18	PROD	Cost Plus
BCS F3	Joint	74	RDTE	Cost Plus
ChemDemil	Joint	78	RDTE	Other
DTS	Joint	18	PROD	Cost Plus

## 3.2 Methods

### Margin of Error Application.

The application of the margin of error occurs differently depending on the position of the initial index point (X) when compared to the identity line (K), and the size of the margin of error and whether or not its application requires crossing the identity line. The equation for applying the margin of error given each possible scenario is given by Equation 20, and the various implementations are illustrated and described forthright.

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} X + \\ X - \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} X < K \\ X \geq K \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} ME \leq |K - \frac{K}{X}| : \quad \frac{K}{\frac{K}{X} - ME} \\ ME > |K - \frac{K}{X}| : \quad K + ME + (K - \frac{K}{X}) \\ ME < X - K : \quad X + ME \\ ME \geq X - K : \quad X + ME \\ ME \leq |K - \frac{K}{X}| : \quad \frac{K}{\frac{K}{X} + ME} \\ ME > |K - \frac{K}{X}| : \quad \frac{K}{\frac{K}{X} + ME} \\ ME < X - K : \quad X - ME \\ ME \geq X - K : \quad \frac{K}{K + (ME - (X - K))} \end{array} \right. \quad (20)$$




Figure 10. Reciprocal Function

$$X \geq K; ME \leq X - K.$$

For cases where the Index point is greater than or equal to K, and the margin of error is less than or equal to the difference of X and K, as illustrated in Figures 9 and 10, the following equations should be used for finding  $X \pm ME$ , as the identity line will not be crossed when finding the lower bound.

$$X + ME = X + ME \quad (21)$$

$$X - ME = X - ME \quad (22)$$

Equations 21 and 22 are very simple because they both occur above the identity line. A simple addition and subtraction will suffice.

$$X \geq K; ME > X - K.$$

For cases where the Index point is greater than or equal to K, and the margin of error is greater than the difference of X and K, the following equations should be used for finding  $X \pm ME$ , as the identity line will be crossed when finding the lower bound.

$$X + ME = X + ME \quad (23)$$

$$X - ME = \frac{K}{K + (ME - (X - K))} \quad (24)$$

Equation 23 is simply the addition of the margin of error to the index point. Equation 24 must take into account crossing K.  $X - K$  is the distance that must be traveled along the Y axis to get to K. This distance is subtracted from ME as it has already been traveled. The remaining distance must be added to K. This distance is then placed under K in order to move along the X axis to the correct lower bound location.

$$X < K; ME \leq |K - K/X|.$$

For cases where the Index point is less than K, and the margin of error is less than or equal to the absolute value of the difference of K and the ratio of K and the Index, as illustrated in Figures 11 and 12, the following equations should be used for finding  $X \pm ME$ .

The logic of this rule is that  $K - \frac{K}{X}$  represents the distance from K to X as can be seen in Figure 11.  $\frac{K}{X}$  represents the nominal point value along the curve, and the difference of K and  $\frac{K}{X}$  represents the distance along the curve that can be traveled before crossing the identity line at K. Equations 27 and 28 are required when crossing K. The absolute value is required when  $X < 0.5$  as this would cause inconsistencies.




Figure 11. Lower CL Does Not Cross ID Line

$$X + ME = \frac{K}{\frac{K}{X} - ME} \quad (25)$$

$$X - ME = \frac{K}{\frac{K}{X} + ME} \quad (26)$$

Equations 25 and 26 handle the addition and subtraction of the margin of error to  $X$ . Figure 11 shows the movement along the reciprocal curve from  $X$ . The restrictions on the use of this equation ensure that the upper bound of the margin of error (denoted by the connected black circles) does not cross the identity line. While the margin of error has potentially significant lateral movement, there is little vertical movement along the curve. This is why a margin of error totaling 6 ( $2 * ME$ ) results in the upper and lower bounds both remaining below 1. The logic of Equation 25 begins




Figure 12. Lower CL Does Cross ID Line

with  $\frac{K}{X}$ , representing the Index value location on the Y axis. The margin of error is subtracted from this value to move left on the X axis toward K. As this movement takes place below the identity line, this movement is placed under K. Equation 26 follows the same logic, but moving farther from K, hence the addition.

$$X < K; ME > |K - \frac{K}{X}|.$$

For cases where the Index point is less than K, and the margin of error is greater than the absolute value of the difference of K and the ratio of K and the Index, as illustrated in Figures 11 and 12, the following equations should be used for finding  $X \pm ME$ .

The logic of this rule is that  $K - \frac{K}{X}$  represents the distance from K to X as can

be seen in Figure 12.  $\frac{K}{X}$  represents the nominal point value along the curve, and the difference of  $K$  and  $\frac{K}{X}$  represents the distance along the curve that can be traveled before crossing  $K$ . As the margin of error exceeds this amount, the identity line will be crossed. The absolute value is required when  $X < 0.5$  as this would cause inconsistencies.

$$X + ME = K + ME + (K - \frac{K}{X}) \quad (27)$$

$$X - ME = \frac{K}{\frac{K}{X} + ME} \quad (28)$$

Equation 27 crosses the identity line.  $\frac{K}{X}$  represents the Index point's location on the  $X$  axis  $K - \frac{K}{X}$  represents the distance from the Index point to the identity line, traveling on the  $X$  axis. This is a negative amount. The distance from  $K$  to the margin of error number, plus this negative amount, results in the proper location along the  $Y$  axis of the curve. Equation 28 is identical to Equation 26 as it performs the same movement.

### **Calculate $EAC_G$ .**

In order to arrive at a true worst case estimate at completion for each leaf element, the pessimistic limit (represented by the '-' sign in the subscript) of both CPI and SPI should be used to calculate the  $EAC_{Comp}$  equation shown in Table 1. This new formulation is presented in Formula 29.

$$EAC_{Comp.G,i,t,-} = ACWP_{CUM,i,t} + \frac{BAC_{i,t} - BCWP_{CUM,i,t}}{CPI_{CUM.G,i,t,-} * SPI_{CUM.G,i,t,-}} \quad (29)$$




Figure 13. Upper CL Does Not Cross ID Line

### Test Against Current Pessimistic EAC.

A comparative hypothesis test will determine if the Alternative  $EAC_{Comp.G,-}$  provides a better worst case upper bound for EAC than the current worst case scenario  $EAC_{Comp}$ . The effectiveness of the metric will be graded using one tailed pairwise Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test, determining if at times  $\delta$ : 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50% complete, the worst case EAC is actually more than the BAC reported at times  $\phi$ : 60%, 70%, 80%, and 90% complete. The use of multiple comparison points enabled the largest number of contracts to be analyzed and their results compared enabling stronger inferences. The Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test was used as the assumptions required for a pairwise t-test could not be satisfied based on the characteristics of the data. The pairwise test performed between the status quo pessimistic EAC and the






Figure 14. Upper CL Does Cross ID Line

proposed pessimistic EAC at each percentage complete will ensure that the metrics are different, and that the alternative pessimistic calculation method provides better upper bound. If the alternative EAC provides a better upper bound for more than half of the contracts, then it will be determined to be the better method of calculation.

The pairwise Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test will be performed at  $\alpha = 0.05$ . The alternatives for the test are as follows:  $H_0 : M_{G,time\delta} \leq M_{SQ,time\delta}$  and  $H_a : M_{G,time\delta} > M_{SQ,time\delta}$ , with the NULL hypothesis being that the median of the leaf EACs computed using the status quo method is greater than the leaf EACs computed using the proposed method. The alternative is that the median of the leaf EACs computed using the status quo method is less than the leaf EACs computed using the proposed method, which represents that the  $EAC_G$  calculation produced significantly differ-

ent results than the status quo method, and provided a higher and therefore more pessimistic estimate.

### 3.3 Results

The alternative pessimistic EAC calculation presented produced significantly different estimates that were more pessimistic than the status quo estimate in at least 85% of the contracts under review. Specific figures can be seen in Table 6, with breakouts by service illustrated in Figure 13. Results for the Army, Navy, and Air Force programs are robust and illustrate the strength of the alternative pessimistic EAC calculation, while the results from the Joint program contracts call this strength into question until the extremely small sample size is considered. Given the small sample size and the general peculiarity of joint programs, this result does not have the power to diminish the overall findings as enumerated in the final row of Table 6.




Figure 15. EAC Calculation Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test Results

**Table 6. Summary of EAC Calculation Comparison Analysis**

Test Point $\phi$	0.6					0.7					0.8					0.9				
Test Point $\delta$	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5
Result	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val
Army	0.895	0.947	0.947	0.947	0.947	1	1	1	0.938	1	1	1	1	0.923	1	0.909	0.909	0.909	0.909	0.909
	n=19					n=16					n=13					n=11				
Result	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val
Navy	0.885	0.885	0.962	0.962	0.923	0.84	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.818	0.864	0.864	0.864	0.864	0.842	0.842	0.947	0.947	0.895
	n=26					n=25					n=22					n=19				
Result	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val
Air Force	0.92	0.92	0.88	0.84	0.88	0.842	0.842	0.947	0.947	0.895	0.917	0.917	0.917	0.917	0.917	1	1	1	0.857	1
	n=25					n=19					n=12					n=7				
Result	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val
Joint	0.5	0.5	0.75	0.75	0.75	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.333	0.333	0.667	0.667	0.667
	n=4					n=3					n=3					n=3				
Result	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val	P-Val
Total	0.878	0.892	0.919	0.905	0.905	0.889	0.905	0.937	0.921	0.921	0.9	0.92	0.92	0.9	0.92	0.85	0.85	0.925	0.9	0.9
	n=74					n=63					n=50					n=40				
Test Point $\phi$ represents the point in time (% program complete) of the EAC that is taken as the true correct EAC																				
Test Point $\delta$ represents the point in time (% program complete) of the EAC that is compared to the EAC at Test Point $\phi$																				
Result P-Val represents the % of programs whose Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test had a P-Value less than 0.05.																				
This result demonstrates that the two methods of calculation produced significantly different EAC sets.																				

### 3.4 Discussion and Conclusion

As the intent of producing an alternative EAC was to provide a better upper bound pessimistic estimate, the proposed  $EAC_G$  satisfies that intent. It produces an estimate that is more pessimistic than the current calculation of  $EAC_{Comp}$  in over 85% of the contracts reviewed, demonstrating that it is indeed a better pessimistic estimate. With the validation of this estimate, it can now be used to address the issues illustrated in Figure 1, by using the methods presented in this paper. For example, a practitioner would be able to review current EVM information, calculate the pessimistic EAC for each element, and highlight those elements with a pessimistic EAC greater than some subject matter expert derived risk tolerance level. These highlighted elements would represent elements that are most at risk within the program based on the leaf index metrics and the dollar weight of those leaf elements. Elements with alarmingly high pessimistic  $EAC_G$  likely do not provide enough granularity for

the program manager to simply rely on the reported EVM metrics. These are the elements, like Figure 1, that may produce surprises late in the contract, and should therefore be scrutinized through other channels in addition to EVM.

While this use has merit, it is reactive in nature. Using the proposed  $EAC_G$ , formulation of a metric to grade the granularity of a contractor work breakdown while still in the pre-award stage is an area of future research. This future metric will endeavor to provide program managers actionable insight and greater ability to formulate useful G-CWBSs, in a pro-active fashion.

This paper presented a background on Estimate At Completion calculation methods, discussion on the switch from calculating in natural log space to maintaining calculations in unit space, as well as a proposed formula for calculating EAC bounds based on the variability of the WBS leaf elements. The study demonstrated that the upper bound predicted by the proposed formulation represents a better pessimistic estimate than the current worst case EAC formulation by providing a true upper bound in over 85% of the programs studied.

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## IV. Generating Random DoD Program Data

### 4.1 Introduction

Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition programs are well known for their complexity, and infamous for their tendency to experience budget growth. From the current example of the Air Force’s F-35 program (Leonard & Wallace, 2014) to the recent historical example of the Navy’s canceled A-12 program (GAO, 1992), DoD acquisition history is littered with programs whose initial estimated cost ballooned. The cause of this growth is a heavily discussed topic that will not be broached here. Instead, the topic of this article is to address an issue that plagues those who analyze DoD budget growth: the issue of insufficient data (Rosado, 2011; Johnson, 2014; Keaton, 2015).

This is not to say that the DoD is entirely lacking data. With the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 and the mandates given to the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, there has been a large growth in available data. The cost and schedule control Earned Value Management (EVM) data needed for contract cost analysis have even been amassed into a useful and relatively (for government analysts) accessible database maintained by the Office of the Secretary of Defense called the Cost Analysis Data Enterprise (CADE). This access to data is welcoming for practitioners, but appropriate replicates of different program types which would enable robust analysis of macro trends and factors is still lacking.

The specific analysis this article focuses on, a brief overview of which is in Section 2, is concerned with EVM data reported at varying levels of granularity, and the effect that this granularity has on government program management’s ability to control the program and make timely and informed management decisions. The CADE system held 67 program contract data files that contained the work breakdown

structure (WBS) at different levels of granularity and reported in a format consistent with governing regulations and guidelines (DoD, 2011; Fitzpatrick, Meyer, & Stubbs, 2016). These programs can be characterized by different demographic parameters that can be filtered within the CADE database system. These demographics include the responsible branch of service (4 levels), program phase (3 levels), contract vehicle (3 levels), and system type (12 levels). When these simple demographic parameters are considered, 432 combinations can be constructed. The 67 program files only come from 44 of the demographic combinations, many being unique, with the most numerous combinations having only 5 demographic replicates. This makes finding analogous systems or pools of systems for parametric analysis unfeasible, reducing or eliminating the rigor, benefit, and applicability of quantitative analysis.

Previous research has introduced the G-Score (Fitzpatrick, Meyer, & Stubbs, 2016), a metric that can be applied reactively to a program's Work Breakdown Structure, highlighting those leaf elements that are most at risk and require additional program management oversight beyond the normal cost and schedule control tools of earned value management. These leaf elements are at risk because the WBS in place is not granular enough to provide early warning that an underlying work package within the leaf element is experiencing difficulties (Fleming & Koppelman, 2000; Fitzpatrick, White, Lucas, & Elshaw, 2016). This metric had to be applied reactively because the WBS for the systems under review were already set, and no further granularity was available for testing alternative structures. The G-Score has the potential to be used prescriptively before the Work Breakdown Structure is solidified at the time of contract award, being applied to compare the usefulness of different WBS forms.



## 4.2 Methodology

As EVM research focuses on understanding contract cost growth, the increase in contract cost from contract award to contract completion is treated as the dependent variable. There are many potential reasons for cost growth that would affect this contract cost, including but not limited to changes in requirements (Sullivan, 2011), congressional budget shifts (Gounatidis, 2006; Smirnoff & Hicks, 2008), program rebaselining (Ruter & Philip, 2007), and technological difficulties causing cost and schedule delays (Blickstein et al, 2011). The simulation model was not designed to account for these specific occurrences, because each of these occurrences is likely unique to the specific program whose data was retrieved from the CADE database. Instead the simulation model will replicate the overall range of increases, without trying to identify, explain, and model the reasons for the increases.

In order to create the database of constructed program files, a random program generator was built in R based on inputs using the data set retrieved from the CADE database as described in the next section. This distributed generator made use of 24 networked computers operating in parallel, with each computer creating one entire program's worth of EVM data. Upon completion of a replication, the generated data files were placed into a central repository for future analysis, and the next replication was tasked, systematically producing replicates for each demographic combination by means of for loops and logic checks ensuring complete data coverage.

### **Analysis of Input Variable Distributions.**

The input variables were examined through the lens of the demographic parameters, which were systematically chosen to ensure appropriate replicates. The observed cost increase distribution was shown to be best explained when modeled against system type using a normal distribution, with specific parameters given in Table 7.

**Table 7. Cost Increase Distribution By System**

System Type	Mean	Standard De- viation	Shapiro Wilkes P- Value
All	0.192537	0.20604	0.0138
Aircraft System	0.183333	0.163649	0.7136
Electronic System	0.251667	0.220701	0.9345
Missile System	0.13	0.176352	0.0199
Ordinance	0.188	0.334021	0.0045
Sea System	0.12	0.111056	0.5027
Space System	0.2975	0.251843	0.5
Surface Vehicle	0.36667	0.086217	0.6788
Unmanned Air System	0.125	0.049498	1
Automated Information System	.325	.250932	0.4346

The observed distribution of the number of months was fit using a Weibull distribution, based on both the responsible branch and the phase of the program. Table 8 shows the parameters available, with the bold figures representing the variables input to the model. The decision to use the scale parameter from one demographic variable, and the shape parameter from another demographic variable, came about during data exploration, and was supported by empirical observations and existing policy. For example, the scale parameter dictated by phase reflected the mean number of months for a program, which corresponds to fiscal law requirements limiting the length of time for funds expenditure and full funding requirements (10 U.S.C. 2366b). The shape parameter, influencing the skew of the distribution based on branch, corresponds with the type of items procured and the inherent lead time needed, such as the difference between a new armored transport truck and a new aircraft carrier.

The initial program cost, or the estimated cost at completion (EAC) at time 0, was shown to follow a log normal distribution based on branch as illustrated in Table 9. The Air Force did fail the goodness of fit test at  $\alpha = 0.05$ , however the log normal distribution had the most passing scores of the distributions investigated. For this reason and to attempt to keep the model from growing in complexity, the log normal was maintained as the best distribution.

**Table 8. Month Distribution By Phase and Branch**

By Phase			
Phase	Scale	Shape	Cramer-von Mises W Test
EMD	<b>42.93187</b>	3.73898	0.25
RDTE	<b>58.00806</b>	1.836495	0.1364
PROD	<b>45.52715</b>	1.686539	0.1881
By Branch			
Branch	Scale	Shape	Cramer-von Mises W Test
Army	48.51867	<b>2.72801</b>	0.25
Navy	66.21203	<b>1.993546</b>	0.1048
Air Force	50.39073	<b>1.439873</b>	0.1048
Joint	52.81163	<b>1.663965</b>	0.0521

**Table 9. Initial Program Cost Distribution By Branch**

Branch	Scale $\mu$	Shape $\sigma$	Kolmogorov's D
All	19.17084	1.48063	0.01
Army	19.05398	1.222855	0.1119
Navy	19.69577	1.72445	0.0926
Air Force	18.89883	1.76352	0.0494
Joint	18.57293	1.172564	0.15

### Simulation Variables.

With the program demographics systematically chosen, and the contract initial cost, length, and cost growth characteristics determined based on those demographics, the remaining variables used in the stochastic model will be determined using Monte Carlo methods. While Monte Carlo modeling has been used previously to explore predictive capabilities of earned value management metrics (Colin & Vanhoucke, 2014), as well as monitoring and forecasting project performance (Barraza, Back, & Mata, 2000; Barraza, Back, & Mata, 2004), it has not been found in the literature to have been used to create entire program contracts.

The input parameters of the simulation variables have been modeled with many different distribution shapes. Where possible, input values are empirically derived from the observed programs in the CADE database. Where this is not possible, parameters were taken from previous studies found throughout the literature to create

distributions. When the literature was barren, the remaining parameters were created using a Bayesian approach with initial values coming from the authors' experience and discussions with defense acquisition personnel. These parameters were then iteratively tuned to arrive at the posterior distributions (Kennedy & O'Hagan, 2001). The specific distributions and sources are presented in Table 10. Those parameters that were based on the Bayesian estimator approach lent themselves more toward the triangular distribution, as the data was lacking to fit a more nuanced form.

**Table 10. Variable Distributions**

Triangular Distributions					
Variable	Min	Max	Mode	Justification	
Avg Fully Burdened Labor Rate (Avg FBLR)	130	200	150	Bayesian Calibration	
Software Growth Multiplier	0.9	1.9	1.3	Literature (Holchin, 2003)	
Easy Work Package Shift	0.1	1.0	0.6	Bayesian Calibration	
Hard Work Package Shift	1	12	4	Bayesian Calibration	
Work Package Time Delay	0	2.5	0.25	Bayesian Calibration	
Technology Readiness Level	Min	Max	Med	Bayesian Calibration	
Normal Distributions					
Variable	Mean	StdDev	Justification		
Work Package Team Cost	Avg FBLR	10	Bayesian Calibration		
Truncated Normal Distributions					
Variable	Mean	Std Dev	Lower Trunc	Upper Trunc	Justification
Work Package Temporal Distribution	2	2.2	0	Number of Months	Literature (Brown, White, Ritschel, & Seibel, 2015)
Log Normal Distributions					
Variable	Mean	StdDev	Justification		
Initial Program Cost	Demographic Dependant	Demographic Dependant	Empirical Analysis of CADE		
Delay Cost Factor	Demographic Dependant	Demographic Dependant	Empirical Analysis of CADE		
Weibull Distributions					
Variable	Shape	Scale	Justification		
Number of Months	Demographic Dependant	Demographic Dependant	Empirical Analysis of CADE		

## The Random Program Generator.

Building the random program generator required the steps illustrated in Figure 16. Due to the complexity of the system, components will be examined in detail. The first step, illustrated in Figure 17, is to determine the initial program cost parameters based on the demographic inputs of this iteration. With the parameters determined, the initial program cost can be stochastically calculated. The contract phase of the specific iteration is checked based on the demographic information, al-




Figure 16. Simulation Process Illustration

lowing the ACAT level of the program to be determined based on the definitions of DoD Instruction 5000.02. Following this, the scale and shape parameters for determining the length of the contract in months is chosen based on the demographics of the iteration, and used to stochastically determine the number of months for this specific program iteration.

Figure 18 illustrates how a vector of team sizes is stochastically chosen so that each work package can have a different number of team members. Similarly the team cost is stochastically determined so that each team has a different cost which reflects the different costs of various labor elements that will be responsible for carrying out the work. The dollar size of the work packages will be calculated based on these two input variables: team size and team cost. In this way the work packages will represent different team sizes and functions. A heuristic within the project management community is to size a work package so that it contains 80 hours of effort or 2 weeks




Figure 17. Initial Program Cost and Months

worth of work (Richardson, 2010). This heuristic will be adhered to by calculating the WP size using formula  $WorkPackage_{Dollar} = TeamSize * TeamCost * Hours$ . The actual number of work packages can then be determined by summing the vector of work package costs until the entire initial program cost is represented. Given




Figure 18. Create Work Packages


the proliferation of technology, it is assumed that every program will require some percentage of software, with Figure 19 illustrating the process to determine software

impacts on the model. As the distribution of the percentage of the program that requires software cannot be modeled due to lack of explicit reporting, a uniform distribution between 0 and 80% was used in an effort to reduce bias when choosing the specific amount that any given program would have. This stochastically determined software percentage was used in a binomial distribution creating a binary vector that determines if a work package is software. The next step is to determine for those work packages that are software, what is the amount of code growth that is likely to occur. This vector of parameters is also stochastically determined based on a distribution derived from the Holchin code growth study (2003). The output of this process is illustrated in Table 11.

**Table 11. Example of Software Designations**

<b>Work Package Number</b>	<b>Is Software</b>	<b>Code Growth Possible</b>	<b>Code Growth</b>
1	1	0.3	0.3
2	1	0.21	0.21
3	0	0.64	0
4	1	0.82	0.82
5	0	0.47	0
6	0	0.39	0
7	1	0.53	0.53
8	0	0.61	0
9	1	0.76	0.76
10	0	0.14	0

Drezner and Smith (1990) demonstrated that cost and schedule growth are correlated, leading to the creation of the delay cost factor illustrated in Figure 20. In order to account for the specific programmatic hurdles that each system type faces, it is hypothesized that the delay cost factor is based on the system type. The delay cost factor parameters are determined based on the demographics of the iteration, and then based on those parameters the delay cost factor is stochastically chosen.



**Figure 19. Software Percentage**

Through the iterative calibration process during initial model design, it was found that this delay cost factor needed to be transformed by slight multiplication and addition in order to pass validation. The next step is to assign technology readiness levels to each work package, as illustrated in Figure 21. Technology readiness levels, or TRLs, have been used to describe the level of maturity that an element of a system exhibits as defined in Table 12. Rodrigues (2000) demonstrated that lower TRL levels correlated with cost and schedule slips, and are therefore likely to influence our dependent variable of cost growth. In this model, TRL levels serve as a proxy for the level of difficulty in accomplishing the work package. The TRLs assigned are based







Figure 20. Delay Cost Factor

on the demographic inputs of the phase of the program, as well as definitional inputs that determine what technology readiness levels are acceptable for program initiation (ASD R&E, 2013). Once the demographic check determines the appropriate range of TRL values, a vector of technology readiness levels is stochastically chosen and assigned to each work package.



**Figure 21. Technology Readiness Level Distribution**

**Table 12. Technology Readiness Levels**


TRL	Definition
9	Actual system proven through successful mission operations
8	Actual system completed and qualified through test and demonstration
7	System prototype demonstration in relevant environment
6	System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in relevant environment
5	Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment
4	Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory environment
3	Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof of concept
2	Technology concept and/or application formulated
1	Basic principals observed and reported

Each work package is then temporally distributed across the number of months that was determined previously. This temporal distribution is stochastically deter-

mined based on a truncated normal distribution which enables the characteristic S-curve to take shape. A vector of temporal factors is then created which will cause the work package to be delayed or moved forward in the schedule. This movement direction is decided by the technology readiness level of work package. As the technology readiness levels for every phase are generally of range three, the middle value will not move while the upper value, representing more mature technology, is likely to be moved forward because it is easier. Those work packages with lower technology readiness levels, representing less mature technology, are assumed to be more difficult and therefore likely to be shifted to the right, taking longer.

At this point, the final cost for each work package, as well as the required time to complete a work package, is determined. Each is a function of the time delay, the time shift, and the software growth if any. If there is a delay or a stretch of the work package, or if there is a shift forward in the schedule this will be calculated, resulting in a determination of where each work package will end up in the temporal range. For example a work package that was expected to be completed in period 10 but was easier and therefore shifted left in the schedule could be expected to be completed in period 7.

The next step is to create the hierarchy. At this point every work package has been assigned initial cost and time distribution as well as a shifted cost and time distribution. These work packages need to be aggregated in a series of parent-child relationships until the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) is formed (Richardson, 2010). To understand the parent-child relationships that form a WBS, consider the construction of a house. ‘House’ is the parent, while ‘framing’, ‘plumbing’, ‘electrical’, ‘concrete’, etc., are the children. Children can be parents too, with ‘electrical’ being a parent to ‘wiring’, ‘outlets’, ‘switches’, ‘fuses’, etc. as the children. This process can continue until every nail of the house is accounted for as a child, and every child



**Figure 22. Simplified Simulation Process Illustration**

gets rolled up until there is only the final house. In order to create these parent-child relationships, a vector of the number of children elements each parent element receives is stochastically chosen, with the distribution of potential children per parent based on observations within the CADE data. Using the house example again, the number of children under the parent element ‘concrete’ will be relatively few, while the number of children under the parent ‘plumbing’ will be more numerous. This assignment of children elements to parents is carried out for every level, then each level is rolled up and the process is repeated until there is only one element which represents the entire program. In this way the hierarchical formulation of the C-CWBS will occur until the sum of all work packages is represented at the highest WBS level (Fleming

& Koppelman, 2000). A simplified version of this hierarchical roll up is illustrated in Table 13.


**Table 13. Work Breakdown Structure Hierarchy Example**

Element Names			Element Dollar Values		
1	1.1	1.1.1	\$1,000	\$300	\$125
1	1.1	1.1.2	\$1,000	\$300	\$25
1	1.1	1.1.3	\$1,000	\$300	\$100
1	1.1	1.1.4	\$1,000	\$300	\$50
1	1.2	1.2.1	\$1,000	\$100	\$100
1	1.3	1.3.1	\$1,000	\$150	\$85
1	1.3	1.3.2	\$1,000	\$150	\$65
1	1.4	1.4.1	\$1,000	\$75	\$75
1	1.5	1.5.1	\$1,000	\$200	\$200
1	1.6	1.6.1	\$1,000	\$150	\$30
1	1.6	1.6.2	\$1,000	\$150	\$40
1	1.6	1.6.3	\$1,000	\$150	\$25
1	1.6	1.6.4	\$1,000	\$150	\$55
1	1.7	1.7.1	\$1,000	\$25	\$25

At each level a name will be given stating the string of numbers that represent the individual cell location. The cumulative sum at every level will also be taken. This will create two matrices that represent the name or element location for every work package at every level. At this point the earned value management artifacts can be create. The first artifact, budgeted cost of work scheduled (BCWS), is simply the initial work package cost placed in the original temporal distribution location. The next artifact, budgeted cost of work performed (BCWP), is the initial work package cost placed in the temporally shifted location, possibly spread over a number of months if the work package was delayed. The final artifact, actual cost of work performed (ACWP), is the work package final cost after accounting for time delay

costs as well as software growth costs if any, and this is placed in the temporally shifted location.

Finally the top line data for the program contract can be created, and the earned value management graph over time can also be plotted. An example of one of these graphs is presented in Figure 23. This shows the characteristic S curves (Brown et. al., 2015), as well as depicting program cost and schedule irregularities. This process is then iterated for every demographic combination, at least 30 times, pursuant to the central limit theorem. The naming convention for each program can be deciphered



**Figure 23. Earned Value Management Illustration**

based on the following chart. As an example, the contract represented in Figure 23 is an Army program, in EMD, for an aircraft system, using a Firm Fixed Price contract, with an expected duration of 41 months, at a funding level making it an ACAT 3 program, with 24% of the program revolving around software.

**Table 14. Contract Naming Convention**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Levels</b>
Lead Branch	1 - Army 2 - Navy 3 - Air Force 4 - Joint
Contract Phase	1 - EMD 2 - RDTE 3 - Production
System Type	A - Aircraft System B - Electronic System C - Missile System D - Ordinance E - Sea Systems F - Space System G - Surface Vehicle H - Unmanned Air System I - Unmanned Maritime System J - Launch Vehicle K - Automated Information System L - Common Elements
Contract Type	1 - Cost Plus 2 - Firm Fixed Price 3 - Fixed Price Incentive
Duration in Months	Continuous - Rounded to Month
ACAT Level	1 - ACAT I 2 - ACAT II 3 - ACAT III
Percent Software	Continuous - Rounded to Percent

**Model Validation.**

The proposed validation methodology will attempt to validate that the simulation models the population characteristics of contract cost growth. This validation will be accomplished by conducting a t-test at  $\alpha = 0.05$  showing that the range of percent of contract cost increase from the modeled programs is not statistically different than

the range of contract cost increase observed in the sample set. This will demonstrate that as a whole, the randomly generated program files match the distribution of cost increases observed in the observed programs from the CADE database.

### 4.3 Results

The distribution of the dependent variable “Percent Budget Increase” for both the generated data set and the CADE data set can be seen in Figure 24. While not identical, the mean and range closely resemble each other, and performing a two-tailed t-test with  $\alpha = 0.05$  results in  $p - value = 0.8734$  as seen in Figure 25, indicating that the means of the two data sets is not significantly different. As the range and distribution are similar, the generated data set passes the analysis of means criteria for validation as a population.




Figure 24. Boxplot Results



```
welch Two Sample t-test  
  
data: rangen.data and Baseline.Data  
t = -0.1598, df = 84.346, p-value = 0.8734  
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0  
95 percent confidence interval:  
-0.05753549 0.04897557  
sample estimates:  
mean of x mean of y  
0.1882574 0.1925373
```

**Figure 25. T-Test Results**

#### 4.4 Discussion

The goal of this simulation was to create program contract data files with visibility to the work package level, for each possible demographic combination, so that further study could commence to determine the optimal work breakdown structure configuration. With this simulation, the dependent variable “Contract Cost Increase” has been adequately reproduced, representing the effectiveness of the random program generator to create data files that reflect reality. The creation of replicates for each of the demographic combinations already represented in the CADE data set, as well as extrapolating from the empirical data to create forecasted replicates for the demographic combinations not covered in the CADE data set, provides a foundation to build new theory for implementation.

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## V. Determining The Optimal Work Breakdown Structure

### 5.1 Introduction

Defense acquisition programs are amazingly complex, and in order to manage these programs a large number of tools have been created that assist decision-makers. The cost and schedule control tool, Earned Value Management (EVM), has been mandated and implemented on a large number of DOD programs. The specific implementation, driven by the granularity of the government contract work breakdown structure (G-CWBS), is left to government program managers (PM) who have little guidance on the most effective G-CWBS implementation. This lack of guidance has fueled an ongoing search for an optimal level of WBS detail.

Previous qualitative analysis by Bushey (2007) and Thomas (1999) investigated the implementation of reporting policy and presented conceptual frameworks for more useful implementation. Bushey describes the appropriate level of breakout in qualitative terms, noting that an effective cost reporting structure requires flexibility to enable various forms of analysis. EVM practiced only at the top line program level does not provide this flexibility, because there is no ability to determine root-causes of issues with such a high level data point. He goes on to propose a WBS structure down to the Work Package level, as this will allow identification of root causes in cost and schedule discrepancies, and facilitate discussions with the Control Account Managers (CAMs) who are in a position to provide information and alternative action recommendations to the government PM. This recommendation is absolutely correct within the vacuum of a desire for visibility. It is not, however, practical, and does not consider the benefits to the flexibility enjoyed by the contractor by being able to modify individual work packages without going through the bureaucratic maneuvers necessary to modify the Government Contract WBS. The implementation of report-

ing at the Work Package level would increase the reporting burden on the contractor, as well as require contractual approval or language for every minor modification, both of which would increase the cost to the government.

Thomas provides an in-depth review of the literature surrounding the creation and implementation of the regulation requiring EVM, and attempts to determine if the policies it contains actually impede acquisition reform initiatives and a PM's ability to manage. He bases his findings, that the policy does in fact hinder acquisition reform initiatives and program management, on personal experience and interviews with government and contractor personnel. He posits that a WBS prepared in accordance with MIL-HBK-881 will not provide sufficient insight into many of the elements. The concept that limiting reporting at too broad a level will inhibit a PM's ability to manage is not controversial, but this scenario is only likely if the PM does the minimum required by the MIL-HBK-881. The actual policy directs the PM to ensure that their WBS is broken out to sufficient detail to allow visibility. What seems to be lacking in the PM community is a method for determining when sufficient detail has been achieved, or when further break-out is required.

Previous quantitative research has not been able to adequately provide broad guidance either. Studies have found within certain program types that a single element is predictive of cost growth at lower than WBS Level 1 (Rosado, 2011), that elemental WBS Level 5 data is no better than elemental WBS Level 3 data (Johnson, 2014), and that lower level WBS data does not improve EAC forecast accuracy (Keaton, 2015). These mixed findings were not generalizable outside of the specific areas of data availability that constrained each research effort, leaving the need for an objective way to determine an optimal level of WBS detail unanswered.

## **New Tools Have Been Introduced.**

EVM has recently been updated with an alternative estimate at completion (EAC) calculation method (Fitzpatrick, White, Lucas, & Elshaw, JCAP 2016). Using this alternative EAC calculation, a pessimistic estimate for every leaf element of a WBS can now occur, which enabled the creation of a new metric. The G-Score introduced by Fitzpatrick, Meyer, and Stubbs (2016), is a quantitative measure that can be used to judge the level of granularity inherent in a given G-CWBS. The G-Score was empirically shown to be a significant explanatory variable when used to forecast contract cost growth from time 0, using only demographic descriptors and information known at the time of contract award. This demonstration, while beneficial, was inherently reactive in nature, as it was used with the firmly entrenched WBS of the historical programs in their data set. A proactive use, the trade-off analysis and design calibration of the work breakdown structure, would provide a tool that helps inform program management decisions on the level of granularity to request from the contractor, before contract award.

A G-score could be calculated for any proposed WBS that is developed providing a way to grade different structural choices. The benefit derived from this is that the program manager would have better understanding of the granularity that the various work breakdown structures under review are capable of. Coupled with a cost to implement each proposed WBS, a cost per level of granularity could be constructed. For example a WBS broken out simply to Level 3 may cost \$500,000 to implement. Another WBS broken out to a fine level of granularity such that no leaf element represents more than 1% of the work to be performed, might cost \$5 million to implement. A third WBS, broken out so that no leaf element would represent more than 4% of work to be performed might cost \$1 million to implement. The corresponding G scores for these three WBS constructs might be 0.1, 0.8, and 0.6, which yields a



corresponding cost per level of granularity of 0.2, 0.16, and 0.6. In this simple example is easy to see that the option which breaks out the WBS to the 4% level gives the greatest value by enabling significant granularity for a reasonable cost. While the WBS broken out to the 1% level offers the most granularity, the cost to implement such a reporting scheme reduces the overall value.

### **Program Management Apprehension.**

Forecasts provided by previously available EVM tools have been disregarded in the past, with Christensen finding that information which may jeopardize the project is sometimes discarded in favor of more optimistic, but less accurate forecasts (Christensen, 1996). This notion is generally supported by the work of Niskanen, who posited that the goal of bureaucrats is to maximize their budget, and would therefore prefer to be rationally ignorant to anything that might reduce their budget (Niskanen, 1975). Another body of work that supports Christensen's findings is Herzberg's Motivation and Hygiene Theory (MHT). The MHT or the two-factor theory of job satisfaction, posits that employee satisfaction and dissatisfaction can be measured on two separate continuum. The motivation factors that influence job satisfaction are intrinsic factors such as achievement, advancement, responsibility, recognition, and the work itself. Hygiene factors affecting dissatisfaction are extrinsic factors such as company policy, salary, work conditions, and supervision (Stello, 2011). A study comparing employees of private and public organizations empirically found that public employees were more influenced by intrinsic factors, while private sector employees reported that extrinsic factors more heavily influenced their job satisfaction (Maidani, 1991). A specific school of thought argues that intrinsically or extrinsically motivated individuals self select themselves into the public or private sector (Christensen & Wright, 2011), however the available incentives of each sector provide

an explanation as well. In the private sector, financial rewards and salary increases are justified by increased revenues generated, whereas the public sector is limited in financial reward options, and salaries are dictated by public law. This difference in available incentives matches very well with the difference in satisfaction factors previously found (Maidani, 1991), which further supports Christensen's findings by illustrating how the incentives that drive government program managers cause them to focus on achieving program approval, and not necessarily on the most efficient use of information if it threatens to disrupt their program.

### **Identify The Paradigms.**

Understanding that program managers have an incentive to see their program succeed, it will be useful to understand the utility that PMs would find in implementing the G-Score. There are two PM perspectives that need to be addressed when applying decision analysis to determine the optimal level of WBS breakout. The previously reviewed research makes it dubious to assume that decision makers will work to maximize the public monetary utility. It is more likely that they will endeavor to maximize their personal utility, not measured in salary which will remain constant based on statute, but in other factors. The two measures that will be used are management utility, and budget utility. Management utility is the benefit that the program manager receives from implementing their chosen WBS structure. This utility is quantified using the G-Score, with higher G-Scores corresponding to higher utility due to the increased granularity with which they will be able to manage their program. Budget utility is the intangible benefit that they receive from being in charge of the program, and the corresponding increase in their budget. An increase in the manager's budget is seen as an increase in utility, with the corollary that program cancellation, or reductions in appropriations results in lower utility.

Finally, there is a third perspective; that of the general public, and the concern for the best use of appropriated funds. This perspective is public utility, or the benefit that the public receives from efficiently executed programs. Public utility corresponds with the generally understood concept that having more money is desirable, and having less money is not desirable. From this perspective, program completion on budget provides maximum utility, while being over budget reduces utility as there is less money for other priorities.

### **Purpose of Study.**

The purpose of this study is to generate an optimal G-CWBS from a variety of Work breakdown structures, from management, budget, and public utility perspectives. The optimal structures will then be compared and analyzed. The results from the management utility perspective will provide an answer to the initial question surrounding optimal WBS breakdown, while the results from the budget and public utility perspectives, and their delta, if any, from the management optimal structure, will be analyzed for any interesting insights.

## **5.2 Methodology**

### **General Description of Utility Theory Process.**

In order to determine the optimal structure, utility theory decision trees will be used for each perspective. The simplified process of using a decision tree contains two node types, decision and probabilistic, to illustrate all possible occurrences, and provide a probability of each occurrence happening. There will only be one decision node on the tree presented, and that will be the decision of the WBS structure. The rule for deciding the structure is to choose the path that has the highest expected utility. In most instances, utility is measured in dollars, however in the case of

the management utility calculation, the G-Score will be the unit of measure. An axiom of utility theory is that more utility is always preferable to less (Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953) , so the optimal WBS structure for each perspective will be that choice which has the maximum utility, in whatever unit space that perspective is.

The uncertainty involved in the decision tree will occur in two places. The first will be the probability that adverse action will occur. Adverse action can take one of 4 forms: Project cancellation, major reduction, medium reduction, or low reduction. It is hypothesized that the likelihood of adverse action increases exponentially as a program goes over budget, with the logic being that a small amount over budget will not likely result in program cancellation, but will likely lead to low reduction, whereas a major overage will very likely lead to a reduction, and may lead to program cancellation. A budget overage that will trigger adverse action is defined as an increase of 25% over expected, which is based on the threshold of a Nunn-McCurdy breach. Specific probability of adverse action is based on the curve and formula illustrated in Figure 26.


The budget overage is based on an estimated EAC using the linear regression model proposed previously proposed (Fitzpatrick, Meyer, & Stubbs 2016). This is based on the G-Score available at time 0, and would give the PM a good feel for if the program is likely to go over budget. Depending on the perspective, the value of this information will change, because if the estimate forecasts significant cost growth, the program may be canceled or stalled for more research. This outcome is desirable for the public utility, but undesirable for the PM's budget utility. Management utility is indifferent to this outcome, as its utility is based on the G-Score and the related granularity.

The probability of adverse action was modeled as an exponential function as seen in Equation 30.  $J$  and  $K$  represent constants parameters that ensure that the proba-

bilities stay between the range of 0 and 100 percent, while  $C$  represents the forecasted cost growth percentage, and  $H$  represents the predetermined cost breach threshold. Equation 31 simply shows the probability of no adverse action.


$$P(Adv) = \frac{J * \exp((1 + C) - H) * K}{100} \quad (30)$$

$$P(N.Adv) = 1 - P(Adv) \quad (31)$$



**Figure 26. Probability of Adverse Action**

Once the probability of adverse action has been determined, the probability of a specific adverse reaction can be calculated. This probability was designed so that, as the estimated cost growth increases, the likelihood of stronger adverse action increases as well.



**Figure 27. Probability of Specific Adverse Actions**

## **Data Preparation.**

The data used for the decision analysis tests was generated using the validated random WBS generator (Fitzpatrick, Meyer, & Stubbs, 2016). Over 10,000 random programs were produced, and a random sample of convenience<sup>1</sup> was taken resulting in 193 programs for further analysis. For each processed program, twenty-five different G-CWBS structures were created in single percentage increments based on a fixed level of reporting representing structures in which the largest leaf element is no larger than some percent. In addition to these twenty-five, three additional structures were created based on reporting at WBS levels three, four, and five. The G-Score of each structure was calculated (Fitzpatrick et al., 2016) and the cost to implement that structure was estimated using the method described in section 2.5, resulting in twenty-eight alternatives for each program. These alternatives were independently chosen, so the specific elements that make up a program broken out to the 5% granularity level will not, as a rule, contain those exact same elements that make up the program broken out to the 2% granularity level. In other words, each level is not a simple roll up of the more granular levels, but instead a randomly generated structure base on the same overall program.

## **Description of Estimating Cost of Implementation.**

In order to accomplish the cost benefit analysis needed to answer the research question, and cost to implement each WBS structure needed to be estimated. As the cost of implementing the WBS structures in the CADE data set is at such a level that it was never reported within the CADE data set, the estimate will rely upon heuristics and generalities. The purpose of this estimate is not so much to accurately predict

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
<sup>1</sup>Due to the large data files and computationally complex processing, a true random sample was not accomplished as unforeseen program coding issues caused the representative lists to error out during processing. In this way, the resulting programs that were processed are not truly random. They have not however, been specifically biased in the form of cherry picking.

costs in the real world, but instead provide a defensible, constant, and reproducible estimate for each of the potential WBS structures, so that comparisons can be made. A crosscheck will also be used based on the Cooper & Lybrand (1994) study that gives a ballpark range for the cost of reporting as a percent of total cost.

The characteristics that the estimate should have: As more detailed data is required, the cost of reporting goes up. The cost increase should not behave linearly with regard to the level of reporting, as the element parent-child relationship would cause expected exponential growth. The primary cost driver in reporting is the creation of the initial reporting system that is agreed upon. It is not assumed that an individual is starting from scratch from each report, but instead is simply turning the handle on a piece of software that was created specifically for the program that is being reported. This indicates that the majority of reporting costs is actually software cost.

The estimate is a simple Cost Estimating Relationship (CER) that states for every  $y = (30 + x) * 2000$  where  $y$  is the cost to implement, and  $x$  is the number of leaf elements plus parent elements that exist in the WBS structure being considered. The parameter 2000 represents an unattributable heuristic of \$2000 per line of code that the authors have previously used in the field. The parameter 30 represents the assumed wrap code that any report would require regardless of the number of individual report elements. It is expected that each reported element requires a line of code to search and sum, and that these lines of code would be added to the wrap code, and multiplied by the cost per line. While this is a very simplistic and undoubtedly flawed approach, this estimation technique produced costs that were comparable to the mean cost of 0.9% of total program cost that Cooper & Lybrand reported in their survey, as illustrated in Figure 28. Additionally it satisfies all desired attributes, creating estimated costs that grew exponentially in accordance with leaf

element proliferation, and as such was found acceptable for creating the comparative costs for use in decision analysis.



**Figure 28. Cost to Implement Status Quo Level of Reporting in Generated Programs**

### Utility Multipliers.

Each potential outcome was given a utility multiplier to reduce expected utility for anything other than full funding as illustrated in Table 15. Management and Public utility multipliers are identical, based on the assumption that a relatively stable decline in utility will be expected as the magnitude of an adverse action to the program increases. For example, the utility of the G-Score is reduced to 0 if the program is canceled, as there will be nothing left to manage. Similarly, the public will



receive no utility from a program that gets canceled. As the adverse actions become less severe, the reduction in utility becomes less severe as well. A program that has been subjected to congressional oversight, budget reductions, and the associated schedule delays, will nevertheless produce utility, however not nearly as much as a program executed to plan. Budget utility, serving as the proxy for the PM's budget maximizing incentives, is more variable. This is based on the assumption that a program cancellation or severe budget reductions would provide negative utility, due to the aura of management failure associated with failed programs. Conversely, low to medium reductions, while reducing the PM's budget, are fairly common and therefore don't also carry the stigma of severely reduced programs. Finally, full funding provide maximum utility for the budget maximizing program manager.

**Table 15. Utility Multipliers**

	Program Cancel	Reduction (High)	Reduction (Medium)	Reduction (Low)	Full Funding
Management Utility	0.0	0.2	0.5	0.8	1.0
Budget Utility	-0.2	-0.1	0.3	0.6	1.0
Public Utility	0.0	0.2	0.5	0.8	1.0

### **Description of Budget Utility Curve Formulation.**


Two assumptions were made when determining the PM's budget utility curve. The first is that the PM finds greater utility with a greater budget, and less utility from a smaller budget. This is based on the motivation factors leading to a desire to maximize their budget. The second assumption is that the decision maker is risk averse, which has been empirically shown to be likely (MacCrimmon, 1968).

The equation used to calculate the utility function for the PM is illustrated as Equation 32, where  $a$  is equal to the minimum possible utility value,  $b$  represents the maximum possible utility value, and  $R$  represents a risk tolerance parameter constant. In this scenario, the maximum and minimum utility values are based on the percentage of the PM's portfolio that the current contract represents, and the  $x$  value represents the base budget utility of the current WBS option. The curves illustrated in Figure 29 show that as the current contract represents a greater share of the PM's total portfolio, the potential utility of the contract rises as well. If they only have one program, the utility to them of that one program is very high, but if they have many programs, the utility of the single program under review is much less. The various curves illustrate that as risk aversion increases, the utility of any program increases, with the loss of the program representing a greater loss of utility than if the decision maker was risk neutral.

$$U(x) = \left[ \frac{1 - \exp\left(\frac{-(x-a)}{R}\right)}{1 - \exp\left(\frac{-(b-a)}{R}\right)} \right] \quad (32)$$

### **Description of Management Utility Curve Formulation.**

The management utility function is quantified as the specific G-Score divided by the cost to implement the proposed work breakdown structure multiplied by the initial program cost (IPC), as illustrated in Equation 33. The fraction of G-Score to implementation cost provides the benefit to cost ratio, while the IPC acts as a scalar to magnify the differences between the different WBS implementations and corresponding G-Scores. As described in the introduction, the WBS that provides the best G-Score to cost ratio will be chosen as the structure providing the most management utility.



**Figure 29. PM Budget Utility by Contract % of Portfolio at Different Risk Tolerances**

$$U(x) = (G - \text{Score}/\text{Cost\_To\_Implement}) * \text{Initial\_Program\_Cost} \quad (33)$$


### **Description of Public Utility Curve Formulation.**

The public utility curve is simply the IPC multiplied by the utility multipliers in Table 15. This is based on the notion that public only cares about the outcome, and an efficient path to that outcome. Full utility occurs when no adverse actions are taken; no utility occurs if the program gets canceled, and utility is reduced if the program gets delayed or comes in over budget.

### **Description of the Decision Tree Tool.**

Figure 30 is a simplified illustration of the decision tree that was created to determine the optimal work breakdown structure for each paradigm. While Figure 30 has 6 decision paths (paths that originate from a rectangle), the actual decision trees had 28 decision paths. 25 of the paths lead to work breakdown structures that had a maximum percentage size of the largest leaf element, incremented in single percentage points. The top four decision paths in the example lead to WBSs where the largest leaf element represents no more than 1%, 3%, 5%, or 9% of the total program cost, respectively. The remaining 3 options were WBSs that were designed to report at a specific WBS level, with Level 3 and Level 4 options illustrated.

For each WBS, an estimate at completion based on the G-Score was used to populate the uncertainty node (represented by a circle in the tree), with the probability of adverse action illustrated in Figure 26 previously. For either adverse action, or not adverse action, there are 5 possible outcomes: Cancellation, Large Budget Reduction, Medium Budget Reduction, Small Budget Reduction, and Full Funding. The probabilities of each of these were illustrated in Figure 27. At this point, a probability of occurrence has been calculated for each potential outcome. The expected utility of each outcome, calculated using the methods described for each utility perspective, are then multiplied by the probability of occurrence. These weighted expected utility values are then summed until there is one value for each decision path. The decision path with the highest expected utility value is then chosen as the optimal solution. This process produced three distinct optimal WBS structures for each program based on the utility perspective.




**Figure 30. Simplified Decision Tree**


### 5.3 Results

The optimal WBS structure results from a management utility perspective is shown in Figure 31. The range of G-Scores achieved by these structures is shown in Figure 33, while the range of costs to implement these structures is shown in Figure 34. These figures illustrate that from a program visibility and control perspective, there is no single “best” structure. While the status quo, reporting at WBS level 3, is the conspicuous mode of the data set, every other possible structure was optimal at least once, with most hovering around 5 programs. This greatly illustrates the cliché answer “It Depends”. Other insights, the average G-Score achieved by these optimal structures was 0.178, with an average cost to implement hovering around \$0.9M.

The optimal WBS structure results from a program manager’s budget utility perspective is shown in Figure 35. The range of G-Scores achieved by these structures is shown in Figure 37, while the range of costs to implement these structures is shown



**Figure 31. Management Utility Optimal Structure Choices**



**Figure 32. Management Utility Optimal Structure Choices - Binned**

in Figure 38. There appears to be a bimodal distribution with optimal scenarios clustered around the status quo, and around small percentage granularization. Other insights, the average G-Score achieved by these optimal structures was 0.19, with an average cost to implement of \$2.6M.




Figure 33. Management Utility Range of G-Scores




Figure 34. Management Utility Range of Costs




Figure 35. Budget Utility Optimal Structure Choices




Figure 36. Budget Utility Optimal Structure Choices - Binned




Figure 37. Budget Utility Range of G-Scores





Figure 38. Budget Utility Range of Costs



The optimal WBS structure results from a program manager’s budget utility perspective is shown in Figure 39. The range of G-Scores achieved by these structures is shown in Figure 41, while the range of costs to implement these structures is shown in Figure 42. Again there appears to be a bimodal distribution, however now there is a definite cluster around the most granular option, as well as the cluster around the status quo. Now, the average G-Score achieved by these optimal structures was 0.26, with an average cost to implement around \$1.6M.



**Figure 39. Public Utility Optimal Structure Choices**




Figure 40. Public Utility Optimal Structure Choices - Binned




Figure 41. Public Utility Range of G-Scores





Figure 42. Public Utility Range of Costs

## 5.4 Discussion


The results presented clearly confirm the notion that, without any guidance or information, the status quo of reporting at WBS level 3 is the most often occurring single WBS structure, regardless of utility perspective. On the other hand, Figures 43, 44, and 45 illustrate that in a binary match-up of the Status Quo: WBS Level 3, or any alternative, the alternative option wins hands down.




**Figure 43. Management Utility Comparison of Status Quo against Alternative Structures**

It is also important to note that when the PM's incentive was to increase their budget, the average cost spent on the optimal structure was higher than the other two perspective. Similarly, when the perspective's incentive was to increase program management, G-Scores were higher. From the public perspective, there seemed to be a desire for either the cheapest, or the most granular and often the most expensive reporting option.

The programs investigated had a representative range of cost overruns. It is hypothesized that those programs with large cost overruns justified the increased



**Figure 44. Budget Utility Comparison of Status Quo against Alternative Structures**



**Figure 45. Public Utility Comparison of Status Quo against Alternative Structures**

expense in granularity level, whereas those programs that did not experience cost growth did not justify the expense.

The bottom line is that all program would benefit from a more tailored approach to WBS structure formulation, and that the G-Score now provides a method to quan-

titatively compare different structures. The program manager will still need to understand their program's strengths and weaknesses enough to know whether they will benefit from the additional insights greater granularity would provide, or if the program is low risk enough that the additional expense of a more granular WBS is not worth it.

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## VI. Discussion

The purpose of this thesis endeavored to answer the question, “What is the optimal level of reporting for earned value management?” The first step in answering this question was to determine the way that a work breakdown structure could be quantitatively measured. The process of creating a quantitative metric began with the observation that there is a large variance in leaf element weights within most work breakdown structures. Using this observation, statistical confidence intervals were considered as a useful tool. Using the observed range of weights, and assuming the corresponding CPI and SPI values are a representative sample of the hidden work package distributions, the  $EAC_G$  calculation was created and validated in the article, “Alternative Formulation of a Pessimistic Estimate at Completion.” This newly developed method of calculation was desirable for quantifying the visibility of a work breakdown structure, because of the interplay of the level of granularity and the range of variances observed. As the work breakdown structure becomes more granular, the potential variance of each index decreases. This causes the confidence interval to shrink with a corresponding reduction in the range of the  $EAC_G$ .

The  $EAC_G$  calculated for each element formed the basis for the G-score metric. As the G-score counts the number of leaf elements with overly pessimistic  $EAC_G$ , G-score will increase as granularity increases. In this way a high G-score quantitatively means more granularity/visibility.

The next research question addressed was how to remove the issue of insufficient data. The data available for retrieval from the CADE database proved useful as a starting point. Also useful was the significant body of research that formed the basis for the simulation model employed. Combining the empirical observations of available data with the significant body of previous research, a complex simulation model was built as detailed in the article, “Generating Random DoD Program Data.” Using



this validated simulation model, a stochastically developed set of EVM data files was produced, allowing inferences made at the population level. While stochastic models have been used previously, nowhere in the literature has an entire database worth of files been systematically created and demonstrated as emulating the empirically observed data, enabling the issue of insufficient data neutralized.

The final two research questions, what is the optimal work breakdown structure and will PMs use it, required first clarification as to the definition of optimal. Specifically, the perspective of the decision-maker who was optimizing was questioned, with three perspectives investigated in the article, “Determining The Optimal Work Breakdown Structure.” Two perspectives of the program manager, that of a budget maximizing bureaucrat and of an information desiring manager, were proposed in addition to the public perspective. The investigation took into account the effect of the program managers portfolio size, as well as a range of possible risk tolerance levels. While the level of risk aversion had an effect on the optimal solutions, the overall distribution of optimal structures did not change. The results demonstrated that the single most common optimal solution for all three paradigms was the status quo work breakdown structure reported at WBS Level 3. While this finding supports the use of Level 3 when no other information is available, the proportion of cases where WBS Level 3 is the optimal solution, is actually quite low. No matter what paradigm was used, an alternative to the status quo was optimal at least 75% of the time.

Luckily, the tool that enabled objective classification of the WBSs, the G-score, also enables the analysis required to determine the alternative to the status quo that is most optimal. While it is not proposed that a PM should ask a contractor for cost proposals associated with each of the 28 alternative structures presented, the PM could request 3 or 4 different levels of granularity and compare the G-scores and cost

to implement for each. In this way, an informed decision based on the specific details of the program and the risk strategy of the PM could be made.

In conclusion, the results demonstrate that there is no silver bullet. There is no single optimal work breakdown structure for earned value management. The optimal structure is heavily dependent on the size, scope, and complexity of the contract, as well as the level of visibility desired by the program manager. Ultimately the decision and responsibility is still with the PM. What can be said conclusively, no matter what paradigm, is that there is often something better than the currently implemented status quo. While the lack of any mechanism for choosing something other than the status quo has held back program managers, the use of the G-score now allows appropriate analysis that can aid PMs in making the work breakdown structure decision deliberately.

## VII. Appendix: G-Score

### Introducing a Metric to Quantify Work Breakdown Structure Effectiveness

B.J. Fitzpatrick, S.J. Meyer, and J.E. Stubbs

#### Abstract

The Earned Value Management tool  $EAC_G$ , which uses statistical theory to develop a pessimistic Estimate at Completion for each leaf element in a Government-Contract Work Breakdown Structure (G-CWBS) was used to construct the G-Score metric. The purpose of the metric is to quantify the level of oversight granularity available to program managers based on the G-CWBS structure. A regression model was constructed using demographic factors, contract information, and the G-Score metric, that determined the G-Score was a significant predictor of contract price growth with a P-value of .0002. Additionally, sequential sum of squares analysis was performed determining the magnitude of additional explanatory power provided by the inclusion of the G-Score metric in the regression model. While the base model produced an adjusted  $R^2$  of .5062, the sequential  $R^2$  of the G-Score metric was .1220, giving program managers significant insight into expected contract price growth, using data available before contract award.

## 7.1 Introduction

Program management of publicly funded acquisition programs remains a crucial focus in the endeavor of public procurement. Defense acquisitions represent a significant proportion of annual government expenses, providing numerous cases to study, as well as future opportunities to effect. The focus of this article is to highlight the cost and schedule control program management tool of Earned Value Management (EVM), and to introduce a metric that will enable better employment of EVM. A thorough understanding of the mechanics of EVM will not be required to understand the metric presented or its usefulness. It is necessary to understand that the Contract Work Breakdown Structure (CWBS) is a different concept to the contractor and the government. Each contract which requires Earned Value Management reporting has a Contractor Contract Work Breakdown Structure (C-CWBS) and a Government Contract Work Breakdown Structure (G-CWBS). While the C-CWBS is broken out to the work package level that enables the contractor to efficiently manage the resources that will accomplish work to be delivered, what government program offices receive as EVM reports is based on the G-CWBS, which is nothing more than a simplification of the actual data within the C-CWBS.

This study proposes a quantitative metric based on sampling theory that will provide program managers with a method to calibrate the EVM tools that they employ, enabling fully informed trade-offs to be made concerning acceptable risk and costs of reporting.

### **Previous Research.**

In order to test the added benefit of the proposed G-Score metric, a thorough understanding of programmatic contract growth is desired. Primary data for contract cost growth comes from the earned value management (EVM) reports that the gov-

ernment receives from contractors. In order to calculate the metrics reported, both a cost and schedule baseline, defined into a series of work packages, is required in order to compare the contract planned progress against its actual progress. Variances between the plan and the actual performance are indicative of problems, and provide an early warning at the project level, and at the leaf element levels broken out.[14]

Previous attempts to forecast cost growth have taken many angles of attack. One of the first interesting investigations into an early warning signal for programs centered on CPI stability in government programs. The research conducted by Payne (1990) and Heise (1991) demonstrated that Cumulative CPI demonstrates stability past the 20% completion point, giving government program managers an early feel for the health of their program. While not an explicit estimated cost, this did provide a vector check very early in the program. Christensen's work throughout the 1990s (1992,1993,1994), continued to explore this stability, as well as to find counterexamples of it. One problem with Christensen's research is that the audience for his work was not narrow enough. In trying to appeal to both the government and industry, he confounded his data sources and tried to generalize findings using one data source to every EVM practitioner, without highlighting the difference between the C-CWBS and the G-CWBS.

The next great wave of forecasting literature highlights a completely different angle of attack. Rossetti (2004), White & Sipple (2004), Moore (2005), Bielecki (2005), McDaniel (2007), and Rusnock (2008) all produced cost growth prediction models for application in various acquisition types and phases that made use of logistic and multiple regression. While the individual efforts produced useful insights for their narrow fields, the small samples sizes due to lack of data hindered the ability to generalize their research, limiting its impact. One further use of logistic regression was explored by Trahan (2009) and Thickstun (2010), who were able to predict Over

Target Baseline (OTB) contracts, and apply a growth model to forecast the estimate at completion for those OTB contracts.

Another field of inquiry saw the application of algorithmic data analysis and predictive analytics to forecast programmatic cost growth. Keaton (2011) tested an algorithm that identified issues in the cost and schedule performance indexes enabling insight into EAC changes over a 1-12 month horizon, providing a greater amount of warning to decision makers. Dowling (2012) developed and optimized detection algorithms that were able to alarm decision makers 70% of the time there was a major programmatic issue. The limitation on Keaton's research is that only 31 programs were used, and only WBS Lvl 1 EVM metrics were used. While Dowling's research produced an EAC prediction, it was limited to accurately predicting a 4 month horizon only.

Research surrounding the impact of schedule on cost growth, and methods of increasing the accuracy and usefulness of schedule forecasts has seen greater focus recently. Crumrine validated that Lipke's original earned schedule theory proved to be a more accurate and timely predictor, providing better metrics for Department of Defense ACAT I programs than the standard Earned Value Management formulations [5]. In order to refine and better predict program duration issues Lipke, Zwikael, Henderson, and Anbari (2009) applied statistical methods to WBS Lvl 1 earned value and earned schedule data. While the use of statistical margin of error estimates was novel, the assumption that the variance between the 12 programs analyzed represents the variance within each program is an assumption that is difficult to accept.

While each of these lines of inquiry produced new ways of forecasting contract cost growth, they each rely on a level of program completion to provide enough data to produce the analysis. Given the problem illustrated in Figure 3, issues can be hidden until a very late point of program completion. With this in mind, a tool that

would allow more insight at a very early stage in the program, potentially even before contract award, would aid program managers in knowing where to apply their scarce resources of time and funding. The G-Score metric will attempt to provide insight into the level of granularity that the G-CWBS provides.

## 7.2 Methodology

### G-Score Formulation.

Using the pessimistic EAC presented by Fitzpatrick, White, Lucas, and Elshaw (2016) (Equation 34), it is possible to calculate the pessimistic EACs for each G-CWBS leaf element. We will use the proposed  $EAC_{G-}$  calculation at the first available time, observed in the data presented in section 2.2.1 as being between time 0% and 17% complete. Using these  $EAC_{G-}$  values it can be determined if any of the leaf element's pessimistic EAC represents cost growth that would individually yield a critical Nunn-McCurdy Act (10 U.S.C. 2433) cost breach of 25% over the current baseline estimate. The Nunn-McCurdy cost breach percentage is arbitrary, and represents a very conservative approach, as a minor breach by a few leafs on one contract will not cause an actual program breach, however for the purposes of this theoretical experiment, it provides a justifiable starting point.

$$EAC_{Comp.G,i,t,-} = ACWP_{CUM,i,t} + \frac{BAC_{i,t} - BCWP_{CUM,i,t}}{CPI_{CUM.G,i,t,-} * SPI_{CUM.G,i,t,-}} \quad (34)$$

The G-Score can be understood as a metric for comparing different G-CWBS architectures. Its calculation can be seen in Formula 35. Essentially the metric sums the number of leaf elements whose pessimistic estimate at completion is greater than the cost breach level, and divides that sum by the total number of leaf elements. This number is then subtracted from 1, so that it feels like a grading scale. A G-

score closer to 1 is desirable as it represents an architecture with enough granularity that the program manager would be made aware of programmatic issues that would result in unacceptable cost growth no later than time  $t$ . As the  $EAC_G$  metric is calculated using the weighted standard deviation of the contract leaf elements to arrive at upper and lower confidence limits, it would be expected that the number of elements that have an upper estimate that breaks the threshold would go down as the WBS structure changes towards having more leaf elements that represent an even distribution of contract funding. If on the other hand, there are only a few leaf elements that hold most of the contract funding, the weighted standard deviation will be quite large, leading to many elements that have an upper estimate greater than the cost breach threshold. As the intent is to give a program manager insight into the program's likely contract price growth as close to contract inception as possible, we will use the first available period of data to calculate the G-Score that will be used as a potential independent variable.

$$G = 1 - \left( \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n \begin{cases} \frac{EAC_{Comp.G,i,t,-}}{BAC_i} \geq (1 + Cost\ Breach\%) & = 1 \\ \frac{EAC_{Comp.G,i,t,-}}{BAC_i} < (1 + Cost\ Breach\%) & = 0 \end{cases}}{Total\ Number\ of\ Leaf\ Elements} \right) \quad (35)$$

### **Regression Analysis.**

In order to empirically validate the proposed metric, a regression analysis was accomplished using the calculated percentage increase of contract price in the first period reported vs the last period reported as the dependent variable. The independent variables were chosen by stepwise procedure from the whole effects as well as polynomial and cross product terms for the variables listed in Tables 16 and 17.



A mixed stepwise function was employed in JMP® using P-value threshold criteria of  $\alpha = .10$  for both entry and exit to selectively refine model elements. All of the possible independent variables are either demographic in nature, or available from the contract. By limiting our study to these variables, the utility of the findings will not be dependent on information that will only become available after a certain percentage of program completion.

**Table 16. Discrete Variables**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Levels</b>
Lead Branch	Army Navy Air Force Joint
Contract Phase	EMD RDTE Production Other
System Type	Aircraft System Electronic System Missile System Ordinance Sea Systems Space System Surface Vehicle Unmanned Air System Launch Vehicle Automated Information System Common Elements
Contract Type	Cost Plus Firm Fixed Price Fixed Price Incentive Other
ACAT Level	ACAT I - 1 ACAT I - 2 ACAT I - 3 ACAT I - 4 ACAT I - 5 ACAT II ACAT III

Table 17. Continuous Variables

Variable	Units
G-CWBS Leaf Elements	Leaf Element
Length of Contract	Months
G-Score	Nominal 0-1

### Data for Regression Analysis.

The data used for analysis was retrieved from the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Cost Assessment Data Enterprise (OSD CADE) system. Of the 276 contract files available in the database, 108 had EVM data broken out into WBS elements, of which 70 contracts had data representing over 60% contract completion (Fitzpatrick et. al., 2016). Once these contracts were used in a preliminary regression model, 3 were shown to be heavily influential as shown in Table 18.

Contract	MPS	<b>0.7659</b>	<b>-0.3768</b>	<b>0.4841</b>	<b>0.5624</b>	0.093	-0.1609	-0.0568	0.1595	0.0724
	GCSS-Army	<b>1.5551</b>	0.2038	0.1427	<b>-0.4994</b>	<b>-0.2455</b>	<b>1.401</b>	0.1432	<b>-0.4663</b>	<b>0.32</b>
	DDG1000	<b>0.9838</b>	-0.0694	<b>0.6028</b>	-0.1866	<b>-0.2531</b>	0.0235	-0.0362	-0.1652	0.1197
	oooooooooooo									
	DFFITS									
	DFBETA - Intercept									
	DFBETA - Contract Length									
	DFBETA - ACAT 3/4									
	DFBETA - ACAT 1-1									
	DFBETA - Automated Information Systems									
DFBETA - Number of Leaf Elements										
DFBETA - G-Score										
Cook's Distance										
DFFITS threshold calculated at $2\sqrt{p/n}$					DFBETA threshold calculated at $2\sqrt{n}$					

Table 18. Influential Data Point Diagnostics

The raw CADE data files were examined, and these three programs each demonstrated similar behavior of the dependent variable, the Contract Price Element, indicating that what was reported was likely the contract burn rate at each period, and not the actual total contract price at each period. Given this reporting discrepancy, these contracts were not able to be used in the final analysis, as they did not provide

<sup>1</sup>While generally broken out into only ACAT I, II, III, or IV, this analysis divided ACAT I into five levels based on funding.

the contract price baseline at period 0 enabling comparison with contract price in the last period reported. Final program contracts used for analysis are listed in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5, and demographic information is illustrated in Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7.

### **Final Regression Model.**

With the three cases eliminated from our data set, the modeling process was iterated again and resulted in the final regression model shown in Equation 36, with the resulting model having an adjusted  $R^2 = .5062$ . The model satisfied all assumptions as the programs were independent, constant variance was verified by plotting the predicted values by the residual values, and normality of the residuals was verified by the Shapiro-Wilkes test resulting with a P-value of 0.0687.

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{Y} = & -0.25722 + 0.0047864(Months) + 0.1452155(ACAT.3) + \\ & 0.2605086(ACAT.1.1) + 0.1848117(Automated.InformationSystems) + \\ & 0.000072682(Number.of.Leaf.Elements) + 0.310968(G - ScoreFirst) \quad (36)\end{aligned}$$

### **G-Score Value Validation.**

Using the regression model, the G-Score parameter's P-value will be observed to determine if it indeed contributes significantly to predict contract cost growth. The sequential sum of squares value of the G-Score as the final parameter will also be calculated to determine the Partial  $R^2$  of the G-Score parameter in order to illustrate the additional power that it gives the model. Finally, a bootstrap analysis using 1000 iterations will be performed to show the range of the G-Score parameter Sequential  $R^2$  expected.

### 7.3 Results

#### Regression Model Results.

Based on the regression model in Equation 36, the resulting parameters, along with their standard errors, P-values, and variance inflation factors are illustrated in Figure 19. All listed parameters are significant at the desired  $\alpha = .05$  level, and all of the VIF scores assure that there is not multicollinearity of the parameters present.

**Table 19. Final Model Parameter Output**

Term	$\beta$ Estimate	Std Error	P-Val	VIF
Intercept	-0.25722	0.064681	0.0002	.
Months	0.0047864	0.000695	< .0001	1.3764
ACAT3	0.1452155	0.046132	0.0026	1.6843
ACAT1-1	0.2605086	0.058546	< .0001	1.2643
Automated Information Systems	0.1848117	0.080346	0.0249	1.1495
Number of Leaf Elements	0.000072682	0.000033	0.0313	1.0447
G-Score First	0.310968	0.076993	0.0002	1.2068


#### Partial $R^2$ Bootstrap Analysis Result.

The results from the sequential sum of squares for the final model is shown in Table 20. Even after the five previous parameters are taken into account, the G-Score at the first available time period explains 12.2% of the variability in the model. Given that the entire model explained 50.62% of contract price growth variability, this represents a substantial increase in explanatory power due to the introduction of the G-Score metric. The Partial  $R^2$  Bootstrap Analysis produced the results illustrated in Figure 46. The mean Partial  $R^2 = .1173$  is very similar to the model Partial  $R^2 = .1220$ , demonstrating the robust explanatory power of the G-Score metric. The close observer will also notice a small bimodal bump where Partial  $R^2 \approx .5$ . After reviewing the bootstrap data log, it was found that these random samples did not contain any Automated Information System data points, dropping that parameter

**Table 20. Sequential Sum of Squares Analysis**

Term	Sequential Sum of Squares	Partial $R^2$
Months	0.61901	0.2192
ACAT3	0.01706	0.0060
ACAT1-1	0.30704	0.1087
Automated Information Systems	0.20809	0.0737
Number of Leaf Elements	0.06029	0.0214
G-Score First	0.34457	0.1220

from the model, where the G-Score metric became far more significant, essentially picking up the explanatory slack.

**Figure 46. Bootstrap Analysis of G-Score Impact on Total  $R^2$** 

## 7.4 Discussion and Conclusion

The G-Score metric has been demonstrated to be a significant predictor variable in modeling contract price growth between the first reported contract price and the final reported contract price. Furthermore, by adding the parameter to the model, an

additional 12% of variability is able to be explained that would not have been with it. While reviewing the literature, there have been models that surpass the explanatory power of the model presented here, however they have all required inputs far greater than simple demographic and contract factors. This increase in insight could greatly help program managers responsible for stewardship of public funds.

While this significant increase in explanatory power can help program managers in their task, it should be highlighted that a high G-Score will not ensure low cost growth. A better interpretation would be that a high G-Score may be indicative of a well defined and well understood program, whereas a low g-score may represent an undefined program, which when better understood will simply cost more. Another interpretation is that a high G-Score will represent a G-CWBS that provides enough granularity to the PM, that when an issue arises, the PM becomes aware of it immediately, instead of being subjected to the potential lag illustrated in Figure 3. With this in mind, if during contract negotiations, the contractor proposes a G-CWBS with a low G-Score, the PM may wish to request a more detailed breakout in the leaf elements that are causing the low metric. If the contractor provides the detailed breakout, the PM will have the visibility necessary throughout the contract period, whereas if the contractor is unable to give a more defined breakout, the leaf elements in question may not be as developed as previously hoped, and additional mitigation efforts may be needed to address the programmatic risk.

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## VIII. Appendix: RPG ANN Validation

### Model Validation.

The second level of validation will demonstrate that contract cost increase for each demographic combination is within the demographic combinations' subpopulation range created using an Artificial Neural Network(ANN) model. A linear regression model was considered for the analysis, however the best model available (Fitzpatrick, Meyer, & Stubbs, 2016) did not find many of the demographic variables significant, and therefore would be unable to provide distinct output ranges based on a specific demographic combination. An ANN was used for its ability to model a complex domain characterized by interacting factors, with the relationship between these factors not well known or defined (Goh, 1995). Specifically, a neural network with backpropagation was used (Werbos, 1988; Günther & Fritsch, 2010), with 6 hidden layers, and training on 80% of the CADE data set. The remaining 20% was used as a validation set. The number and makeup of hidden layers was chosen through an iterative process beginning with the general rule of having at least five to ten training patterns for each weight (Goh, 1995). The final model is illustrated in Figure 47. The forecasted




Figure 47. Artificial Neural Network Illustration

outputs of this ANN, based on the demographic inputs from each random generated


program, were used as the comparative data set for another validation t-test. As this method of validation is experimental, the t-test was conducted at both  $\alpha = 0.05$  and  $\alpha = 0.01$ .

## 8.1 Results

Figure 48 illustrates the distribution of t-test results at the demographic combination level. A perfectly passing model would be one in which the randomly generated program data and corresponding ANN forecasts for all demographic combinations were shown to not be significantly different. At  $\alpha = 0.05$  only 66% of the demographic combinations pass this stage of validation. With a relaxed  $\alpha = 0.01$ , the pass rate increases to 84%, however this still leaves a large number of demographic combinations failing validation. An investigation into the characteristics of the combinations that failed began by highlighting the combinations that appeared in the CADE data set. Figure 49 illustrates only those 44 combinations, which mirror the distribution of passing and failing combinations of the population. The percent of CADE combinations that pass is almost identical at the  $\alpha = 0.05$  level, and is similarly close at the  $\alpha = 0.01$  level. Figure 50 shows the same distribution of CADE combinations, with the additional dimension of weighting. As previously stated, of the 44 demographic combinations represented in the CADE data set, the most numerous had 5 replications, with most being unique. This graphic indicates that those combinations with multiple replicates had a proclivity to fail.

## 8.2 Discussion


The demographic combination validation did not provide conclusive results. Particularly, the tendency of the most numerous demographic combinations to fail, raises concern. This could be indicative of model overfit, causing the forecasted data set



**Figure 48. Predicted vs Generated Increase Ranges Per Demographic Combination**

from the ANN to have a much smaller variance than the random generated data set. Alternatively, the reason for this validation failure could be due to inaccuracy in the random program generator, or some combination of both the ANN and the RPG. A simultaneous calibration procedure and more ANN structures and training profiles will be implemented in the future in an effort to be able to make the specific inferences that would become possible with validated demographic combination results. As it stands, the results presented here are limited in their applicability to generalized statements made at the validated population level.

A great limitation of the results of the simulation model, is that the individual demographic combinations did not pass validation. While greater than half of the demographic combinations did pass, the fact that they all did not pass raised enough uncertainty as to make the use for inference of the demographic combinations unfounded. The reason for this failure of validation could lie with the random program




**Figure 49. Demographic Combinations Represented in CADE Data Set**

generator simulation model or with the artificial neural network forecast that was used to validate the demographic combinations. As both of these processes were highly complex, is not known which one or both and in which what proportion blame lies. Without further research, only general statements can come from the simulation. Specific statements are not fully supported due to the lack of demographic combinations validation.

### 8.3 Appendix

Concerning the demographic combinations that failed validation, the following investigative graphs provide some insight into characteristics and trends. While the figures depict the results of all demographic combinations(DC), the specific combinations that were represented in the CADE data set have been extracted into tables for review. Further analysis into the shared characteristics, if any, of the DCs that



**Figure 50. CADE Demographic Combinations by Number of Occurrences**

failed may provide insight for future modifications to the simulation model or choice of validation protocols.


**Table 21. CADE Combination Groups by Branch**

Army	Count	Pass	Navy	Count	Pass	Air Force	Count	Pass	Joint	Count	Pass
1-2-A-1	2	1	2-2-E-1	2	0	3-1-A-1	5	0	4-3-L-1	2	1
1-3-D-1	1	1	2-2-C-3	1	1	3-1-F-1	1	0	4-2-K-1	1	0
1-2-B-1	4	0	2-2-C-1	2	1	3-2-B-1	5	0	4-1-D-3	1	1
1-1-G-2	1	1	2-2-B-2	1	0	3-2-D-1	1	1			
1-2-C-2	1	1	2-2-A-1	2	0	3-1-D-1	1	1			
1-2-G-3	1	1	2-2-B-1	5	0	3-1-A-3	1	1			
1-1-B-1	1	1	2-3-E-3	1	1	3-3-J-1	1	1			
1-1-B-3	1	1	2-1-A-3	1	1	3-3-A-1	1	0			
1-1-L-1	2	1	2-2-A-3	1	1	3-2-A-1	1	1			
1-1-A-1	1	1	2-2-E-2	1	1	3-2-B-3	1	0			
1-1-C-1	1	0	2-3-E-2	2	1	3-2-F-3	1	0			
1-1-C-3	1	1	2-2-F-1	1	0	3-1-C-2	1	1			
1-2-G-1	1	1	2-1-E-1	1	0	3-3-H-1	2	1			
						3-1-F-3	1	1			
						3-1-D-2	1	1			
Total	18		Total	21		Total	24		Total	4	


**Table 22. CADE Combination Groups by Phase**

EMD	Count	Pass	RDTE	Count	Pass	PROD	Count	Pass
1-1-A-1	1	1	1-2-A-1	2	1	1-3-D-1	1	1
1-1-B-1	1	1	1-2-B-1	4	0	2-3-E-2	2	1
1-1-B-3	1	1	1-2-C-2	1	1	2-3-E-3	1	1
1-1-C-1	1	0	1-2-G-1	1	1	3-3-A-1	1	0
1-1-C-3	1	1	1-2-G-3	1	1	3-3-H-1	2	1
1-1-G-2	1	1	2-2-A-1	2	0	3-3-J-1	1	1
1-1-L-1	2	1	2-2-A-3	1	1	4-3-L-1	2	1
2-1-A-3	1	1	2-2-B-1	5	0			
2-1-E-1	1	0	2-2-B-2	1	0			
3-1-A-1	5	0	2-2-C-1	2	1			
3-1-A-3	1	1	2-2-C-3	1	1			
3-1-C-2	1	1	2-2-E-1	2	0			
3-1-D-1	1	1	2-2-E-2	1	1			
3-1-D-2	1	1	2-2-F-1	1	0			
3-1-F-1	1	0	3-2-A-1	1	1			
3-1-F-3	1	1	3-2-B-1	5	0			
4-1-D-3	1	1	3-2-B-3	1	0			
			3-2-D-1	1	1			
			3-2-F-3	1	0			
			4-2-K-1	1	0			
Total	22		Total	35		Total	10	






**Figure 51. Percentage of Validation Failures by Branch**




**Figure 52. Percentage of Validation Failures by Phase**

**Table 23. CADE Combination Groups by Contract**

Cost Plus	Count	Pass	Firm Fixed Price	Count	Pass	Fixed Price Incentive	Count	Pass
1-1-A-1	1	1	1-1-G-2	1	1	1-1-B-3	1	1
1-1-B-1	1	1	1-2-C-2	1	1	1-1-C-3	1	1
1-1-C-1	1	0	2-2-B-2	1	0	1-2-G-3	1	1
1-1-L-1	2	1	2-2-E-2	1	1	2-1-A-3	1	1
1-2-A-1	2	1	2-3-E-2	2	1	2-2-A-3	1	1
1-2-B-1	4	0	3-1-C-2	1	1	2-2-C-3	1	1
1-2-G-1	1	1	3-1-D-2	1	1	2-3-E-3	1	1
1-3-D-1	1	1				3-1-A-3	1	1
2-1-E-1	1	0				3-1-F-3	1	1
2-2-A-1	2	0				3-2-B-3	1	0
2-2-B-1	5	0				3-2-F-3	1	0
2-2-C-1	2	1				4-1-D-3	1	1
2-2-E-1	2	0						
2-2-F-1	1	0						
3-1-A-1	5	0						
3-1-D-1	1	1						
3-1-F-1	1	0						
3-2-A-1	1	1						
3-2-B-1	5	0						
3-2-D-1	1	1						
3-3-A-1	1	0						
3-3-H-1	2	1						
3-3-J-1	1	1						
4-2-K-1	1	0						
4-3-L-1	2	1						
Total	47		Total	8		Total	12	



**Figure 53. Percentage of Validation Failures by Contract Type**



**Figure 54. Percentage of Validation Failures by System Type**

**Table 24. CADE Combination Groups by System**

Aircraft	Count	Pass	Electronics	Count	Pass	Missiles	Count	Pass	Ordinance	Count	Pass
3-1-A-1	5	0	3-2-B-1	5	0	3-1-C-2	1	1	3-2-D-1	1	1
3-1-A-3	1	1	3-2-B-3	1	0	1-2-C-2	1	1	3-1-D-1	1	1
3-3-A-1	1	0	1-2-B-1	4	0	1-1-C-1	1	0	3-1-D-2	1	1
3-2-A-1	1	1	1-1-B-1	1	1	1-1-C-3	1	1	1-3-D-1	1	1
1-2-A-1	2	1	1-1-B-3	1	1	2-2-C-3	1	1	4-1-D-3	1	1
1-1-A-1	1	1	2-2-B-2	1	0	2-2-C-1	2	1			
2-2-A-1	2	0	2-2-B-1	5	0						
2-1-A-3	1	1									
2-2-A-3	1	1									
Total	15		Total	18		Total	7		Total	5	
Sea	Count	Pass	Space	Count	Pass	Surf Veh	Count	Pass	Unmn Air	Count	Pass
2-2-E-1	2	0	3-1-F-1	1	0	1-1-G-2	1	1	3-3-H-1	2	1
2-3-E-3	1	1	3-2-F-3	1	0	1-2-G-3	1	1			
2-2-E-2	1	1	3-1-F-3	1	1	1-2-G-1	1	1			
2-3-E-2	2	1	2-2-F-1	1	0						
2-1-E-1	1	0									
Total	7		Total	4		Total	3		Total	2	
Unmn Sea	Count	Pass	Launch	Count	Pass	AIS	Count	Pass	Common	Count	Pass
			3-3-J-1	1	1	4-2-K-1	1	0	1-1-L-1	2	1
									4-3-L-1	2	1
Total	0		Total	1		Total	1		Total	4	

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<b>14. ABSTRACT</b>  The optimal level of Government Contract Work Breakdown Structure (G-CWBS) reporting for the purposes of Earned Value Management was inspected. The G-Score Metric was proposed, which can quantitatively grade a G-CWBS, based on a new method of calculating an Estimate At Completion (EAC) cost for each reported element. A random program generator created in R replicated the characteristics of DOD program artifacts retrieved from the Cost Analysis Data Enterprise (CADE) system. The generated artifacts were validated as a population, however validation at the demographic combination level using an artificial neural network was inconclusive. Comparative WBS forms were created for a sample of the generated programs, and used to populate a decision tree. Utility theory tools were applied using three utility perspectives, and optimal WBSs were identified. Results demonstrated that reporting at WBS level 3 is the most common optimal structure, however 75% of the time a different optimal structure exists.						
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